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ABSTRACT 
AUDIT FIRM ROTATION, AUDIT FIRM TENURE, AND AUDIT COMMITTEE 
SUPPORT IN ACCOUNTING DISPUTES 
By 
 
Janice E. Rummell 
 
Since the late 1990s, U.S. regulators have sought to increase auditors’ 
independence from management and to reduce the presumed detrimental effects of 
economic bonding on public company financial reporting. Implementation of mandatory 
audit firm rotation that limits auditor tenure to reduce potential independence impairment 
has been discussed in the U.S. and other jurisdictions, and adopted in some non-U.S. 
jurisdictions. While audit firm rotation is expected to increase auditor independence, the 
opponents of mandatory rotation cite decreasing auditor expertise as a significant 
counter-argument. This independence/expertise trade-off is integral to much of the 
academic discussion of mandatory audit firm rotation.  
The audit committee of the board of directors has received increased attention and 
a strengthening of its role in enhancing auditor independence during this same regulatory 
period. In this study, I bring auditor independence/expertise issues before public 
company audit committee members in an accounting dispute resolution setting. In a 2x2 
experimental study with 109 public company audit committee member participants, audit 
firm tenure (long/short) and audit firm rotation (required/not required) were manipulated 
randomly between subjects, and the participants’ level of support for the audit firm or 
management in a subjective issue accounting dispute was assessed. Employing the 
 vi 
 
auditor reliability framework (Taylor, DeZoort, Munn, & Thomas, 2003; DeZoort, Holt, 
& Taylor, 2012), MANCOVA and ANCOVA analyses were used to test the relationship 
between the independent variables audit firm tenure and rotation, and the audit committee 
member participants’ assessment of audit firm characteristics and support for the auditor. 
Covariates for CPA status, years of management experience, and years of audit 
committee experience were included in the models. 
The primary results indicate that the long audit firm tenure group assessed audit 
firm reliability higher than the short audit firm tenure group. Participants also believed 
that the typical audit committee member would be more supportive of longer tenured 
auditors. When controlling for social desirability bias, the long tenure group provided 
more support for the audit firm proposed adjustment than the short tenure group. 
Participants with more years of audit committee experience were more supportive of the 
audit firm. The required rotation group assessed audit firm expertise higher than the no 
rotation group. A marginally significant interaction between audit firm tenure and 
rotation resulted in the short tenure group assessing audit firm independence higher when 
rotation was required, than when rotation was not required. The hypotheses predicting 
differences in responses for objectivity, reliability, and support based on audit firm 
rotation (required or not required) are not supported. CPA status is associated with 
increased assessments of audit firm expertise, independence, and objectivity, with CPAs 
having higher perceptions of these audit firm characteristics than non-CPAs. Comments 
from participants provide insight into the judgment and decision making process for 
public company audit committee members. 
 vii 
 
This study contributes to the academic literature on mandatory audit firm rotation, 
audit firm tenure, audit committee processes, and the auditor reliability framework. It 
also informs the public policy debate on audit firm independence and tenure, and has 
practical implications for audit committees and stakeholders of public companies.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Public company audit failures through the 1990s and early 2000s, including the 
well-publicized audit failures at Enron and WorldCom, have led to regulatory changes 
designed to promote higher audit quality and restore investor confidence in the financial 
reporting of public companies. One objective of the regulation in the United States was to 
maintain higher levels of external auditor independence from client management. The 
auditor independence theme is drawn primarily from agency theory (Fama and Jensen 
1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976), viewing the independent auditor as a tool for board of 
director monitoring of management on behalf of the shareholders. One primary concern 
is the financial dependence of the auditor on the client firm—economic bonding—that 
can lead to reduced audit firm independence and objectivity. A lack of auditor 
independence was blamed for many financial reporting and auditing failures by the 
investing public and popular press. A lack of auditor independence is believed to lead to 
less objective and less reliable audits, and ultimately lower quality (i.e., less reliable) 
financial statements.  
The detrimental effects of economic bonding presumably increase as auditor 
tenure with the client increases (Casterella & Johnston, 2013). Mandatory audit firm 
rotation, requiring firms to engage a different audit firm after a prescribed number of 
years (often 5, 7, or 10 years), has been promoted as a means of addressing the loss of 
audit quality that some critics believe occurs with extended audit firm tenure with a client 
(Gramling, Jenkins, & Taylor, 2010; Roush, Church, Jenkins, McCracken, & Stanley, 
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2011). Mandatory audit firm rotation is purported to increase auditor independence by 
lessening the economic pressure management can exert on the auditor to settle 
auditor/management disputes over auditor proposed adjustments in a manner preferred by 
management (Arel, Brody, & Pany, 2006; Brown & Wright, 2008; Dopuch, King, & 
Schwartz, 2001).  
A suggested trade-off of audit firm rotation, though, is the loss of auditors’ client-
specific expertise that develops over extended auditor tenure (Casterella & Johnston, 
2013). Impairment of tenure-related auditor expertise, and more audits performed by low 
tenure auditors, has the potential to outweigh the audit quality gains from the enhanced 
auditor independence that mandatory audit firm rotation is expected to provide (Johnson, 
Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002). The contribution that experience and expertise from an 
extended audit firm tenure can make toward promoting a high quality audit is the basis 
for an argument often cited in opposition to mandatory audit firm rotation (Casterella & 
Johnston, 2013; Lim & Tan, 2010; Stefaniak, Robertson, & Houston, 2009).  
Carcello & Nagy (2004) find that fraudulent financial reporting is most likely to 
occur in the first three years of an engagement. Johnson et al. (2002) find that financial 
reporting quality, measured by discretionary accruals, is at its lowest in the first three 
years of auditor tenure. Mandatory audit firm rotation would result in more audits being 
conducted by auditors in the early years of client tenure when the auditor’s client specific 
knowledge, and ability to withstand management pressure based on auditor expertise and 
experience, are likely to be at their lowest. Thus, audit firm rotation seems to promote 
auditor independence, but likely at the cost of reduced auditor expertise. The 
independence/expertise trade-off is integral to much of the academic discussion of 
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mandatory audit firm rotation (e.g., Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008; 
Hoyle, 1978). 
Mandatory audit firm rotation was discussed in the U.S. during the regulatory 
initiative period that followed Enron’s 2001 bankruptcy, but never implemented because 
of adamant opposition from the accounting industry and a lack of persuasive evidence of 
its efficacy. Mandatory audit firm rotation resurfaced in the U.S. in a PCAOB Concept 
Release in 2011. Continuing auditor independence concerns for U.S. registrants 
(Gramling et al., 2010; Roush et al., 2011), and implementation of mandatory audit firm 
rotation in several jurisdictions abroad, emphasize the continuing importance of the issue. 
The use of selective or locally required audit firm rotation has been considered and 
implemented in a few countries, including South Korea (Kim & Yi, 2009) and China 
(Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2012). Further, several U.S. state or local jurisdictions have adopted 
rotation policies for specified companies or non-profit organizations, suggesting selective 
rotation as an alternative to wide-scale mandatory rotation policy. Corporations also can 
implement their own rotation policies in response to shareholder pressure, newly adopted 
best practices, or audit committee directives (Fontaine, Khemakhem, & Herda, 2015; 
Jenkins & Vermeer, 2013). Most recently, the SEC is discussing a new requirement that 
audit committees disclose auditor tenure in audit committee reports, potentially bringing 
auditor tenure further attention from investors and analysts (Whitehouse, 2015).  
The audit committee of the board of directors has assumed increased 
responsibility for promoting higher quality of reported information and promoting 
increased auditor objectivity and independence from management since the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002). Although company management retains 
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responsibility for preparing financial statements, an independent audit committee 
possessing at least a minimum of accounting/financial expertise is charged with the 
hiring, dismissal, and oversight of an external auditor to provide independent testing of 
the financial statements, and with settling auditor/management disagreements over 
proposed audit adjustments (SOX 2002). These three parties – management, auditor, and 
audit committee – represent the governance mechanisms that are responsible for shaping 
the audited annual reports filed by U.S. exchange registrants (Brown & Wright, 2008; 
Carver, 2014). This proposed study addresses recent calls for research on the processes 
and interrelationships among management, the auditor, and the audit committee (Beasley, 
Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009; Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Carcello, Hermanson, & 
Ye, 2011; Salleh & Stewart, 2012) by focusing on the audit committee’s role in auditor-
client management disputes, specifically how this role is affected by mandatory audit 
firm rotation and auditor tenure. 
Although some research has been done on audit committee support for the auditor 
in auditor/management disputes under varying conditions (e.g., Bierstaker, Cohen, 
DeZoort, & Hermanson, 2012; DeZoort, Hermanson, & Houston, 2003a, 2003b, 2008), 
and on the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation on the auditor in auditor/management 
dispute negotiation (Arel et al., 2006; Dopuch et al., 2001; Wang & Tuttle, 2009), no 
studies to date have considered the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation or auditor 
tenure on audit committee judgment in dispute resolution. Mandatory audit firm rotation 
and consideration of auditor tenure should introduce new complexity into the audit 
committee’s resolution of auditor/management disputes, given the unique 
independence/expertise trade-off identified in the literature.  
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The purpose of this study is to assess the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation 
and audit firm tenure on audit committee member support in auditor/management 
disputes over subjective accounting issues. In a case-based experimental setting, 109 U.S. 
public company audit committee members provided data for the primary analysis. A 2x2 
factorial design was used to manipulate the independent variables – mandatory audit firm 
rotation (required or not required) and audit firm tenure (short or long) – between-
subjects, and audit committee member support for the audit firm or management was 
measured as the primary dependent variable. Hypotheses related to audit committee 
support for the audit firm or management were developed for testing, applying the auditor 
reliability framework (Taylor, DeZoort, Munn & Thomas, 2003; DeZoort, Holt, & 
Taylor, 2012) to define and provide a validated measurement model for relevant 
constructs. The reliability framework maintains that audit firm integrity supports 
perceptions of audit firm independence and expertise. It further suggests that perceptions 
of audit firm integrity, expertise, and independence contribute to perceptions of audit firm 
objectivity, and ultimately audit firm reliability. 
Importantly, the use of the auditor reliability framework (Taylor, DeZoort, Munn 
& Thomas, 2003; DeZoort, Holt, & Taylor, 2012) allows for the clarification and precise 
measurement of key constructs, including differences among auditor independence, 
objectivity, and reliability, that often have been confused in the auditing and auditor 
rotation literature. The current study is, to my knowledge, the first study to incorporate 
the auditor reliability framework into the audit committee literature. I predict that level of 
audit firm tenure and rotation will influence audit committee member perceptions of audit 
firm expertise, independence, objectivity, and reliability. Furthermore, I posit that long 
6 
 
 
 
audit firm tenure will lead to increased audit committee member support for the audit 
firm in an accounting dispute, as will the absence of required audit firm rotation.  
The primary results indicate that the long audit firm tenure group assessed audit 
firm reliability higher than the short tenure group. Participants believed that the typical 
audit committee member would be more supportive of longer tenured auditors. When 
controlling for social desirability bias, the long tenure group provided more support for 
the audit firm proposed adjustment than the short tenure group. Participants with more 
years of audit committee experience were more supportive of the audit firm. A 
marginally significant interaction between audit firm tenure and rotation resulted in the 
short tenure group assessing audit firm independence higher when rotation was required 
than when rotation was not required. The hypotheses predicting differences in responses 
for objectivity, reliability and support based on audit firm rotation (required or not 
required) are not supported. CPA status was associated with perceptions of auditor 
expertise, independence, and objectivity, with CPAs having more favorable views than 
non-CPAs. Comments from participants provide insight into the judgment and decision 
making process for public company audit committee members. 
This research extends the literature on the audit committee’s role in 
auditor/management dispute resolution under varying levels of audit firm rotation / tenure 
when the accounting issue is subjective. The study also contributes to research on audit 
committee judgment and decision-making, and further extends the application of the 
auditor reliability framework in audit settings. The study has policy implications, adding 
to the literature on the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation and audit firm tenure on 
financial reporting quality and auditor independence. The current study also has practice 
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implications, providing insights into the possible effects of audit committee adoption of 
audit firm rotation at the company level. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Auditor Rotation and Tenure 
Auditing standards and auditor codes of conduct require independence from client 
management and objectivity for auditors in financial accounting examinations (e.g., SOX 
Title I, section 103; AICPA Rule 101). While auditor independence and objectivity are 
promoted through regulation and professional standards, questions remain as to the 
efficacy of the current regulations (Carcello, Neal, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2011; Gramling 
et al., 2010). Concerns about auditor tenure and its impact on auditor independence and 
objectivity led to discussions of limits on audit firm tenure when SOX was being 
developed, although ultimately mandatory rotations of audit partners in charge of the 
audit engagement, rather than audit firms, was included in SOX.  
The PCAOB commissioned the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to 
conduct a study of mandatory audit firm rotation in 2003, resulting in a GAO 
recommendation that mandatory audit firm rotation was not in the best interests of public 
policy at the time (GAO 2003).
1
 The PCAOB withdrew its concept release on mandatory 
audit firm rotation issued in 2011, but the SEC and PCAOB continue to keep the issue 
within their armory for potential use in promoting auditor independence and objectivity. 
The retention of mandatory firm rotation as an option may be for good reason, because 
mandatory audit firm rotation rises to the top of U.S. public interest advocacy issues for 
                                                 
1
 The GAO 2003 report cites costs of mandatory audit firm rotation in excess of the benefits and allowing 
sufficient time for SOX (2002) auditor independence enhancing regulation to be fully implemented and 
working as reasons for deferring additional study on implementing mandatory audit firm rotation in the 
U.S. at that time. 
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public accountancy with surprising regularity. Opponents of mandatory audit firm 
rotation were successful in pressuring the U.S. House of Representatives to pass a 2012 
bill that would amend SOX (2002) to prohibit the adoption of mandatory audit firm 
rotation (H.R. 1564). The pressure to pass such a bill most likely stems from continuing 
concern over renewed mandatory audit firm rotation sentiment for U.S. public 
companies. However, adoption of mandatory audit firm rotation in jurisdictions abroad 
will apply to and impact statutory audits of some overseas business units of U.S. public 
companies with global operations, regardless of these domestic actions.  
Proponents of mandatory audit firm rotation traditionally cite two primary 
arguments for its adoption: 1) the quality of audit work tends to decrease over time and 
mandatory rotation provides a “fresh look” and 2) auditor independence and objectivity 
can be compromised by a long-term relationship with client management (Hoyle, 1978). 
Although a presumed link between extended auditor tenure and reduced independence / 
quality of audits—and so financial reporting—is the driving force behind attempts to 
implement mandatory audit firm rotation, academic studies have not found that greater 
auditor tenure is consistent with earnings quality deterioration (Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008). 
Rather, research findings support that extended auditor tenure can result in benefits 
related to the auditor’s industry and firm-specific expertise. This expertise/experience 
argument is one of the most cited reasons for opposition to mandatory audit firm rotation 
(Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Lim & Tan, 2010; Stefaniak et al., 2009). Evidence 
suggests that the risks of audit failure can be more pronounced in the early years of an 
audit engagement (Cameran, Francis, Marra, & Pettinicchio, 2015; Carcello & Nagy, 
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2004), and earnings quality is higher with longer auditor tenure (Myers, Myers, & Omer, 
2003), lending more support to the benefits of longer auditor tenure.  
Jenkins & Vermeer (2013), however, consider the extant evidence regarding 
auditor tenure and audit quality on the whole as inconclusive. These accounting 
researchers find the research subject to bias from studying a presumed mandatory rotation 
effect in a voluntary auditor change environment, including the U.S. audit market. 
Jenkins & Vermeer (2013) suggest further that the relationship between auditor tenure 
and audit quality is not linear, but goes through auditor learning and auditor closeness 
phases. Casterella & Johnson (2013) also point out the weakness in many mandatory 
audit firm rotation studies conducted in environments of voluntary, rather than 
mandatory, auditor change. Additionally, Casterella & Johnson (2013) discuss issues 
related to auditor self-selection bias. The auditor self-selection bias results from poor 
performing, high audit risk firms changing auditors frequently, reinforcing the findings of 
negative outcomes of low auditor tenure clients. More stable companies tend to keep the 
same auditor for a longer period, reinforcing the appearance of higher quality for longer 
auditor tenures. 
Some academic studies lend support to the perceived benefits of mandatory audit 
firm rotation on auditor independence and objectivity (Arel et al., 2006; Bamber & Iyer, 
2007; Dopuch et al., 2001; Joe, Wright & Wright, 2011; Wang & Tuttle, 2009). In a post-
SOX study of auditor response to management pressure, client management still 
influences auditor judgment in some firms (Hatfield, Jackson, & Vandervelde, 2011). 
Therefore, consideration of measures to increase auditor objectivity and independence 
from management, like mandatory audit firm rotation, are not unreasonable. While the 
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PCAOB has retreated from consideration of proposed mandatory audit firm rotation for 
U.S. registrants (PCAOB, 2013), other countries have implemented mandatory audit firm 
rotation, including Brazil, Italy, and Singapore. The European Common Market has 
passed a 10 year mandatory audit firm rule effective in 2016, with provisions allowing 
the extension of the mandatory rotation period by 10 or 14 years under specific 
circumstances.  
The European rule is cited as a method of reducing audit market concentration 
issues by forcing the consideration of second-tier accounting firms (firms other than Big 
4) when a replacement auditor is required. Market concentration concerns–that the Big 4 
firms control too much of the public company auditing market–are evident in the U.S. as 
well (GAO, 2003, 2008; US Treasury, 2008). Boone, Khurana & Raman (2012) find an 
association between auditor concentration and increased auditor tolerance for earnings 
management, lending credence to the concern over market concentration as a threat to 
auditor independence.  
Although much of the academic and public policy discussion of mandatory audit 
firm rotation focuses on auditor independence, the goal of rotation is ultimately an 
increase in audit quality and auditor reliability. The many definitions of audit quality, and 
the identification of proxies for its measurement, add to the difficulty in synthesizing the 
academic literature on auditor tenure and rotation. DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit 
quality is defined by the probability that an auditor will both detect a potential 
misstatement and report it. Proxies used for operationalizing audit quality include the 
willingness of the auditor to give a going concern opinion (an independence proxy), the 
occurrence of financial restatements or litigation, and financial statement discretionary 
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accruals (see Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, & Velury, 2013 for a review). As 
discussed in more detail in a later section, auditor reliability exists when users of 
information find the auditor’s work credible and dependable (Taylor et al., 2003).  
One study of auditor rotation policies and their impact on loan officer perceptions 
finds that while auditor rotation increased perceptions of auditor independence, it did not 
affect perceptions of audit quality (Daniels & Booker, 2011). Kaplan & Mauldin (2008) 
find that non-professional investors’ perceptions of auditor independence are not 
enhanced by audit firm rotation, compared to the already required audit partner rotation. 
This finding is inconsistent with an earlier study (Gates, Lowe, & Reckers, 2007), 
although Gates et al. find audit firm rotation increases individuals’2 confidence in 
financial statements, while audit partner rotation does not. Kaplan & Mauldin (2008) find 
further that a strong audit committee, as opposed to a weak audit committee, can enhance                                                
non-professional investors’ perception of auditor independence.  
In regards to auditor tenure, a study of investor and financial information 
intermediary perceptions of auditor tenure finds increased auditor tenure associated with 
perceptions of increased auditor quality, and increased return coefficients on reported 
earnings (Ghosh & Moon, 2005). Ghosh and Moon (2005) maintain that these findings 
could imply “unintended costs on capital market participants” (p. 588) from required 
audit firm rotation that limits auditor tenure. In an experimental study using 
undergraduate students as proxies for jurors, Brandon & Mueller (2008) find that while 
increased tenure is associated with decreased assessments of auditor independence, 
increased tenure is also associated with increased assessments of auditor competence. 
Thus, the independence/expertise argument has been tested in the litigation setting. In this 
                                                 
2
 This study used MBA and law students as subjects. 
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study, I will test the independence/expertise trade-off as it applies to audit committee 
judgment and decision-making in settling accounting disputes. 
In the following sections, a literature review of the audit committee’s role in 
accounting dispute resolution, specifically disputes involving subjective accounting 
issues, is presented. A discussion of the auditor reliability framework (Taylor et al., 2003; 
DeZoort et al., 2012) then follows. The positioning of the reliability framework as a 
means of evaluating the complex array of ethical constructs that will be applied to audit 
committee judgment and decision-making in accounting disputes involving audit firm 
proposed adjustments of a subjective nature is then explained. Development of 
hypotheses for testing follows.  
The Audit Committee’s Role in Auditor/Management Disputes 
Regulations in SOX (section 301) require the audit committee to settle disputes 
between the auditor and management. PCAOB (AS 16, para 22) expects the audit 
committee to be apprised of all contentious accounting issues, even if they are settled 
between the auditor and management. When auditor/management disputes are brought to 
the audit committee, the audit committee members are expected to settle the dispute over 
the proposed adjustment. This settlement involves determining if an adjustment should be 
made to the financial statements, as the auditor suggests, and the amount to be recorded 
or disclosed.  
Pomeroy (2010) finds that audit committee members investigate management 
accounting decisions more as the decisions become increasingly aggressive, providing 
some support that audit committee members actively oversee financial reporting. 
However, the role of the audit committee in resolving disputes is not consistently 
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portrayed in the literature, with varying degrees of involvement and effectiveness 
presented in the research. Several studies find that in some firms auditor/management 
disputes are expected to be resolved without the audit committee’s involvement (Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2010; Gendron & Bédard, 2006). Additional studies find that 
the role of audit committees in dispute resolution is limited (Gibbins, McCracken, & 
Salterio, 2005; Gibbins, Salterio, & Webb, 2001).  
In contrast, there are studies consistent with the audit committee now playing a 
greater role in promoting auditor independence from management in general and in 
auditor/management dispute resolution in particular. Fontaine, Khemakhem, & Herda 
(2015) find in a recent interview study with Canadian audit committee members that 
these audit committee members feel they are capable of promoting auditor independence 
without mandatory audit firm rotation, and they see mandatory audit firm rotation as 
interfering wth their authority to oversee the external auditor. In an experimental setting, 
DeZoort et al. (2008) find that audit committee members were more supportive of the 
auditor in auditor/management disputes post-SOX, compared to the pre-SOX period. 
Cohen at al. (2010) report that audit partners and managers believe audit committee 
influence has increased post-SOX.  
The audit committee can also moderate threats to auditor independence through 
financial reporting and auditor engagement oversight, according to a study by Sharma, 
Sharma, & Ananthanarayanan (2011). Salleh & Stewart (2012) apply a case study 
approach to seven public companies in Malaysia and find that the audit committee plays a 
very active role in auditor/management dispute resolution. Many of the experimental 
studies on audit committee judgment in accounting dispute resolution find that audit 
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committee members, particularly those associated with strong audit committees, 
generally do support the auditor proposed adjustment, although the level of support varies 
based on manipulated conditions (Kaplan & Mauldin, 2008).  
Misplaced audit committee member support in auditor/management disputes can 
lead to financial reporting errors, those requiring restatements in particular, that can result 
in loss of current and future board of director seats (Srinivasan, 2005). The potential for 
lost board seats can provide incentive for audit committee members to support the 
auditor’s proposed adjustment, particularly when the issue is more objective (DeZoort et 
al., 2003a). Keune & Johnstone (2012) find that audit committees with high expertise, 
combined with external auditor concerns about reputational penalties, lead to fewer 
waived adjustments.  
These reputational risks, to the audit committee and the auditor, can lead to more 
conservatism in financial reporting, and more audit committee support for the auditor. 
The auditor has reason to gauge the independence of the audit committee from 
management when approaching dispute resolution, particularly when there is pressure to 
manage earnings (Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2011). One caveat, 
though, is the degree of CEO influence in nominating the audit committee member, 
which can reduce the member’s support for the auditor (Carcello et al., 2011; Lisic, Neal, 
& Zhang, 2011). CEO influence has the potential to protect audit committee members 
from loss of current and future board seats if a restatement should occur (Carver, 2014), 
leading to lower audit committee support for the auditor. 
SOX (2002) gave the power for the hiring, dismissing, compensation, and 
oversight of the external auditor to the audit committee. Reserving this power for the 
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audit committee, as opposed to management, is designed to protect the auditor from 
management threats of dismissal that are presumed to interfere with auditor 
independence. Audit committee control over the external auditor can be evident in 
practice if the audit committee is relatively free from management influence in selecting 
and retaining the auditor.  
Prior academic research supports that objective accounting issues result in 
increased audit committee member support for the auditor (DeZoort et al., 2003a; Knapp, 
1987; Ng & Tan, 2003; Wright & Wright, 1997). Although these studies did not 
specifically test audit committee support for the auditor in consideration of mandatory 
audit firm rotation, the presence of authoritative guidance for an objective auditor 
proposed adjustment leaves little room for an independent audit commmitee member to 
withhold support for the auditor regardless of the presence or absence of mandatory audit 
form rotation. Audit committee support for auditor proposed adjustments is less assured 
in accounting disputes involving subjective accounting issues requiring estimation and 
judgment. The lack of predictability of audit committee support supplies the tension in 
this experimental study, as audit committee members’ judgment and decision-making 
results regarding subjective auditor proposed adustments can vary widely. Accounting 
disputes involving subjective accounting issues are the focus of my study.  
When the accounting dispute involves a subjective accounting issue, the auditor 
has less technical and authoritative support for the auditor proposed adjustment, and the 
disposition of the disagreement is arguably in greater doubt. Brown-Liburd & Wright 
(2011) suggest that these subjective issues often require auditor-client negotiations, 
compared to “objective, clear-cut issues”. This finding is consistent with several other 
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studies (Gibbins, Salterio, & Webb, 2001; Salleh & Stewart, 2012) that find accounting 
issues with less authoritative guidance—subjective issues—require negotiation between 
the auditor and client, and are identified as the type of issues auditors are more willing to 
discuss (Nelson, Elliot, & Tarpley, 2002). It follows that the issues most prone to 
negotiation between the auditor and management are the issues most likely to reach the 
audit committee.  
Prior research suggests that when the issue in the dispute involves interpretation 
and judgment, the auditor is potentially at a disadvantage to management in the 
negotiation process (Deis & Giroux, 1992), and the disadvantage could carry over when 
the dispute reaches the audit committee. Audit adjustments characterized as subjective 
were waived by the auditor more often than adjustments characterized as objective 
(Braun, 2001; Nelson, Elliot, & Tarpley, 2002; Wright & Wright, 1997). Auditors could 
be perceived as less persuasive by audit committee members when less authoritative 
guidance is present, as in the case of a subjective accounting issue. The subjectivity of the 
accounting issue could lead to lower perceived auditor expertise compared to 
management, particularly firm specific expertise, when issue based judgment is required. 
Additionally, the auditor’s argument could appear less compelling than the arguments put 
forth by management to waive the proposed adjustment due to management’s first-hand 
knowledge of the business. The reduced perception of auditor expertise or the 
persuasiveness of the management argument has the potential to decrease audit 
committee support for the auditor in some accounting dispute situations.  
Auditor Reliability Framework and Hypotheses Development 
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While agency theory, discussed in Chapter 1, provides an overall theoretical 
framework for this study of audit committee support for the auditor in resolving 
auditor/management disputes, the auditor Reliability Framework (Taylor et al., 2003, 
DeZoort et al., 2012) helps to explain the judgment and decision-making process of the 
audit committee members. The framework helps define and sort out the complex ethical 
constructs underlying the audit committee members’ assessment of auditor reliability, 
and identify relationships among the constructs. A significant issue in audit quality 
research is a lack of consistency in and universal understanding of the constructs used to 
describe auditor characteristics such as independence and objectivity. DeZoort et al. 
(2012) assert that references to auditor independence impairments are overused, and the 
real issue in many cases is auditor objectivity, integrity, or reliability (Taylor et al., 
2003). Taylor et al. (2003) developed an auditor reliability framework, further refined in 
DeZoort et al. (2012), to clarify and operationalize these auditor related constructs. The 
framework has since been expanded to apply to non-audit assurance situations, as well, 
not just in the audit setting (DeZoort & Taylor, 2009). The reliability framework, adapted 
for use in this case, is shown in Figure 1.  
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Fig. 1. Conceptual framework. Constructs up to and including Auditor Reliability introduced by Taylor et 
al. (2003) and modified in DeZoort et al. (2012). 
 
Auditor integrity (a focus on truthful reporting) is the framework’s foundation and 
a critical antecedent to auditor independence, expertise, objectivity, and reliability. 
Reliability is the crux of the framework, defined as “a condition where stakeholders 
consistently find the auditor’s work credible and dependable, even after acknowledging 
the inherent limitations of audit and other attest functions” (DeZoort et al., 2012, pp. 519-
520). Auditor expertise and independence influence auditor objectivity, which in turn 
influences auditor reliability. The framework also posits that integrity influences auditor 
AUDIT COMMITTEE
MEMBER SUPPORT
FOR THE AUDITOR
PROPOSED 
ADJUSTMENT
AUDITOR 
EXPERTISE
AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE
AUDITOR
OBJECTIVITY
AUDITOR
INTEGRITY
AUDITOR
RELIABILITY
20 
 
 
 
reliability directly and indirectly through its influence on auditor expertise, independence, 
and objectivity. One of the most important findings from an empirical test of the 
relationships in the reliability framework is that auditor reliability can be achieved 
through objectivity, expertise, and integrity even when auditor independence from 
management is compromised through the provision of non-audit services (DeZoort et al., 
2012). The construct definitions related to the auditor reliability framework are provided 
below in Table 1 (wording below is from or adapted from DeZoort et al. (2012)). 
Table 1 Auditor Reliability Framework Construct Definitions 
CONSTRUCT DEFINITION 
Auditor Integrity 
Ability to be straightforward, honest, and 
forthright in all professional and business 
activities; focus on “truthful reporting” 
Auditor Expertise 
Technical knowledge, ability, and 
experience needed to achieve task-specific 
superior performance 
Auditor Independence 
A relationship based construct where by 
the auditor is not biased by management 
Auditor Objectivity 
Auditor’s state of mind and ability to 
manage cognitive biases and subjectivity 
that inherently affect professional 
judgments and decisions 
Auditor Reliability 
A condition where stakeholders 
consistently find the auditor’s work and 
opinion credible and dependable 
 
Several experimental studies on audit committee member support for the auditor 
in accounting disputes provide the best available insights into the reasons that audit 
committee members provide support for the auditor, and these reasons can generally be 
linked to auditor reliability. DeZoort & Salterio (2001) cite reasons for audit committee 
support for the auditor in their study of audit committee dispute resolution and find 
auditor expertise as an area of concern. Auditor expertise is an element of the auditor 
reliability framework, influencing auditor objectivity and reliability.  
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DeZoort et al. (2008) provide comparative rationales for audit committee support 
for auditor proposed adjustments pre- and post-SOX in their experimental study. DeZoort 
et al. (2008) find that materiality, quality reporting, and risk were the most commonly 
cited rationale for auditor support pre-SOX, with auditor credibility cited by 18% of 
subjects. Post-SOX, DeZoort et al. (2008) find reporting accuracy has replaced 
materiality as the rationale most cited by audit committee members for supporting the 
auditor, followed by conservatism and immediate resolution, materiality, and auditor 
credibility (13% of subjects.) Support for the auditor based on reporting accuracy can be 
interpreted as an indication of perceived auditor expertise and/or independence.  
Conservatism in reporting could indicate an assessment of auditor independence 
or objectivity, as auditors propose adjustments to correct for management’s aggressive 
reporting assessment. Bierstaker et al. (2012) find in their study of audit committee 
support for the auditor under varying audit committee compensation schemes that 
conservatism and auditor objectivity were the primary rationales for auditor support. 
Auditor objectivity is one of the antecedents to auditor reliability in the reliability 
framework, and is influenced by expertise and independence. 
Audit Firm Expertise 
In settling auditor/management disputes, the audit committee must consider the 
domain expertise of the auditor in terms of technical and industry knowledge and ability, 
as well as the firm-specific expertise of the auditor. In the reliability framework (Taylor 
et al., 2003; DeZoort et al., 2012) expertise is an antecedent to objectivity, and objectivity 
is an antecedent to reliability. One primary criticism of mandatory audit firm rotation is 
the loss of firm specific expertise resulting from the required periodic auditor change. 
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Several frequently cited studies (for example, Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Geiger & 
Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002) support that longer auditor tenure is associated 
with increased audit quality, with audit quality measured by absence of fraudulent 
reporting, audit failure for companies in bankruptcy, and the extent of discretionary 
accruals, respectively. Knapp (1991) notes in his study of audit committee members 
specifically that long auditor tenure is viewed by audit committee members as a proxy for 
audit quality. Chi (2005) emphasizes the need for the auditor to gain experience and build 
client-specific assets in order to achieve higher audit quality. A more recent study (Chi, 
Lisic, & Pevner, 2011) supported the association between longer auditor tenure and 
increased earnings quality, measured by discretionary accruals.
3
  
Kwon, Lim, & Simnett (2014) note in their study of mandatory audit firm rotation 
in South Korea that the auditor in new engagements tend to “rely on clients’ estimates 
and representations” (p. 7) because they lack firm-specific knowledge about operating, 
accounting, and internal control systems. In an early article on mandatory audit firm 
rotation, Hoyle (1978) notes that the “complexity and size of most modern businesses 
simply do not lend themselves to short audit engagements” (p. 6). In addition to tenure 
effects, required audit firm rotation is expected to lessen the incentive audit firms have to 
develop firm specific expertise from the beginning of the relationship, because they will 
be unable to use the expertise when the rotation period ends (Jones et al., 2012).  
Overall, because audit firm size and characteristics, like specialization, will be 
held constant in the experimental case, the assessment of auditor expertise by audit 
committee members should be based on primarily the manipulation of auditor tenure 
                                                 
3
 Chi et al. (2011) also find, though, that firms were more likely to resort to “real earnings management” 
when accrual earnings management was constrained by a higher quality audit.  
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between short and long. But required audit firm rotation is also expected to affect the 
audit committee members’ assessment of audit firm expertise, as a required rotation 
could reduce the incentive audit firms have to build and develop client-specific 
knowledge. It was noted in the 2003 GAO report on mandatory audit firm rotation that 
59% of Tier 1 audit firms indicated that under mandatory audit firm rotation, they would 
reposition the “most knowledgeable and experienced” audit staff before the end of 
limited engagement period to “help attract and retain” other clients.4 In this study, I 
expect long audit firm tenure and no required rotation to lead to higher audit committee 
member perception of audit firm expertise. Formally stated: 
H1a: Audit committee members will assess audit firm expertise as higher when 
audit firm tenure is long than when tenure is short. 
 
H1b: Audit committee members will assess audit firm expertise as higher when 
audit firm rotation is not required than when rotation is required. 
 
Audit Firm Independence 
In regards to independence, a perceived or assumed lack of independence between 
the auditor and the client management fuels the debate over mandatory audit firm 
rotation. When rotation is not required, the threat to independence results from the 
auditor’s desire to maintain the potential future revenue stream from remaining in the 
audit engagement (DeAngelo 1981). The resulting economic bond, according to 
proponents of mandatory audit firm rotation, can result in the auditor succumbing to 
management pressure to waive or withdraw proposed adjustments to please management. 
In the auditor reliability framework (Taylor et al., 2003; DeZoort et al., 2012) 
independence, along with expertise, is an antecedent of auditor objectivity.  
                                                 
4
 The GAO defined Tier 1 audit firms as the 97 public accounting firms that had 10 or more public 
company clients. 
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The manipulation of audit firm rotation (required/not required) should influence 
audit committee assessments of audit firm independence. Required audit firm rotation is 
presumed to increase perceptions of audit firm independence for those outside the 
financial reporting process, particularly investors (Jenkins & Vermeer, 2013). Required 
rotation addresses potential conflicts of interest arising from economic bonding and is 
viewed as an “effective antidote” to management pressure (Jenkins & Vermeer, 2013). 
Because the audit committee is mandated to enhance audit firm independence and protect 
the interests of shareholders (investors) from management, required rotation is expected 
to increase audit committee perceptions of audit firm independence.  
Audit firm tenure is also expected to influence audit committee member 
perceptions of audit firm independence. Several studies have considered the association 
between auditor tenure and perceptions of auditor independence from management, some 
finding that increased auditor tenure is not necessarily associated with perceptions of 
impaired auditor independence. Iyer & Rama (2004) find that CPA subjects acting as 
CEOs, CFOs, controllers, and treasurers perceive they are more able to persuade a short 
tenure auditor than a long tenure auditor to accept the management position in an 
accounting dispute. And increased auditor tenure alone does not bring the auditor’s 
independence from management into question for audit committee members, according 
to a mixed methods study by Almer, Philbrick, & Rupley (2014).  
In contrast, there are studies that find auditor independence decreasing as tenure 
increases. Davis, Soo, & Trompeter (2009) and Chu, Church, & Zhang (2012) find 
evidence of decreased audit quality after the 14
th
 year of auditor tenure in separate 
studies, with both studies using sample data from 1988 to 2006. The accounting literature 
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also suggests that the auditor tenure/auditor independence relationship is non-linear, and 
that the association between auditor tenure and measures of audit quality can change over 
time (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2008; Jenkins & Velury, 2008). I predict in this study 
that long audit firm tenure will decrease audit committee perceptions of audit firm 
independence. To formally state the hypotheses related to audit committee perceptions of 
audit firm independence: 
H2a: Audit committee members will assess audit firm independence as higher 
when audit firm tenure is short than when tenure is long. 
 
H2b: Audit committee members will assess audit firm independence as higher 
when audit firm rotation is required than when rotation is not required. 
 
Audit Firm Objectivity
5
 
In assessing the auditor’s objectivity, audit committee members will consider 
their assessment of auditor expertise and independence, in addition to any effect of 
integrity. The hypotheses related to audit firm tenure/rotation and audit firm expertise and 
independence are summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2 Summary of Hypotheses Related to Audit Firm Expertise and Independence 
MANIPULATION 
AUDIT COMMITTEE  
PERCEPTION OF AUDIT FIRM 
EXPERTISE 
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
PERCEPTION OF AUDIT FIRM 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
AUDIT FIRM TENURE 
Long tenure increases perception 
of audit firm expertise 
Short tenure increases perception 
of audit firm independence 
 
AUDIT FIRM ROTATION 
No required rotation increases 
perception of audit firm expertise 
Required rotation increases 
perception of audit firm 
independence 
                                                 
5
 In addition to the audit firm’s expertise and independence, audit committee members likely also consider 
audit firm integrity as they determine their level of support for the audit firm in settling the accounting 
dispute. DeZoort et al. (2012) note that judgments about audit firm integrity provide the basis for users of 
accounting information to trust that the audit firm has expertise and independence. The academic literature 
provides no guidance to predict the effect of audit firm rotation and tenure on perceptions of audit firm 
integrity, although testing of the auditor reliability framework (DeZoort et al., 2012) has supported 
perceptions of auditor integrity as positively related to perceptions of auditor reliability for commercial 
lenders. Due to the lack of a basis in the literature for predicting the influence of auditor tenure or rotation 
on audit committee perceptions of auditor integrity, I gather data on the committee members’ assessment of 
auditor integrity for analysis, but no formal hypothesis is tested. 
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In this study, because the accounting dispute involves a subjective accounting 
issue, audit firm expertise is expected to weigh more heavily in the audit committee 
member’s assessment of objectivity than is the audit firm’s independence. Furthermore, 
because the issue has already reached the audit committee, the perception of audit firm 
independence from management is likely less of a concern. As audit committee members 
address this independence/expertise trade-off, I expect the audit firm expertise 
characteristics will influence audit committee member judgment more than the 
independence concerns. An audit quality meta-analysis conducted by Lin & Hwang 
(2010) finds that the benefit of longer auditor tenure outweighs the “potential 
independence impairments” and that longer auditor tenure is negatively associated with 
earnings management. Although Gavious (2007) notes that the accounting profession’s 
reputation was damaged by scandals at Enron and WorldCom, Hollingsworth & Li 
(2012) find that investors’ concerns over economic bonding have decreased since the 
passage of SOX. The observed decrease in concerns over economic bonding since SOX 
adds to the expectation that audit committee members in this post-SOX study will weigh 
the expertise effects of increased tenure more heavily than any independence impairment 
effects on objectivity. 
I predict, then, that long tenure and no required rotation will be associated with 
higher audit committee perceptions of audit firm objectivity. The hypotheses related to 
audit committee perceptions of audit firm objectivity stated formally: 
H3a: Audit committee members will assess audit firm objectivity as higher when 
audit firm tenure is long than when tenure is short. 
 
H3b: Audit committee members will assess audit firm objectivity as higher when 
audit firm rotation is not required than when rotation is required. 
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Audit Firm Reliability 
The focus of the auditor reliability framework (Taylor et al., 2003, DeZoort et al., 
2012) is auditor reliability, which follows from perceptions of auditor objectivity. 
Auditor reliability is defined in the framework (Taylor et al., 2003, p. 258) as the 
“condition where stakeholders consistently find the auditor’s work and opinion credible 
and dependable.” DeZoort et al. (2012) find support for their hypothesized relationship 
between objectivity and reliability in their study of the auditor reliability framework 
applied to commercial lenders’ judgments. I posit that long tenure and no required 
rotation will lead to higher levels of perceived audit firm objectivity by audit committee 
members, and so extend this reasoning to audit committee perceptions of audit firm 
reliability.  
H4a: Audit committee members will assess audit firm reliability as higher when 
audit firm tenure is long than when tenure is short. 
 
H4b: Audit committee members will assess audit firm reliability as higher when 
audit firm rotation is not required than when rotation is required. 
 
Support for the Audit Firm or Management 
The audit committee member assessments of audit firm expertise, independence, 
integrity, objectivity and reliability will influence their level of Support for the audit firm 
or management in the accounting dispute, the primary dependent variable in this study. 
Because I argue that long audit firm tenure will enhance audit committee perceptions of 
audit firm expertise, objectivity, and reliability, and have a limited negative effect on 
audit committee member assessments of audit firm independence, I posit that audit 
committee members will provide more support for the audit firm proposed adjustment 
when audit firm tenure is long rather than when tenure is short.  
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H5a: Audit committee members will provide stronger support for a proposed 
audit adjustment when audit firm tenure is long than when tenure is short. 
 
Additionally, because I propose that the absence of mandatory rotation will lead 
to increased assessments of audit firm expertise, objectivity, and reliability despite the 
possibility of an increased perception of audit firm independence impairment, I posit that 
audit committee members will provide more support for the audit firm proposed 
adjustment when rotation is not required, compared to when it is required.  
H5b: Audit committee members will provide stronger support for a proposed 
audit adjustment when mandatory audit firm rotation is not required than when 
rotation is required. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODS 
Participants 
The participants in the study were public company audit committee members 
drawn from the Audit Analytics database. Because this study tests hypotheses related to 
audit committee member judgment, actual audit committee members are the preferred 
population from which to draw subjects, following Bierstaker et al. (2012), DeZoort et al. 
(2003a, 2003b, 2008), and Knapp (1987). Audit committee members appointed between 
2011 and 2013 were selected to provide a pool of potential participants with at least two 
years of audit committee experience. The selection was then filtered to focus on audit 
committee appointments to companies with less than $4 billion in assets, so as to be 
reasonably comparable to the company in the case materials. This process resulted in 
over 2,000 potential audit committee member participants.  
Each potential participant was then checked manually against the corporate proxy 
filing to verify audit committee membership. Potential participants were eliminated if 
they no longer were serving on the audit committee, if no proxy for the corporation was 
filed, or if the corporation had a foreign address or was currently being acquired by 
another company. Audit committee members with duplicate addresses, whether the 
addresses were for the corporation being served or the audit committee members’ 
business addresses, were eliminated to avoid potential collusion on the completion of the 
experimental case. 
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This selection process resulted in the identification of 866 audit committee 
members with unique addresses, and all were included on the mailing list. In the Results 
section, I provide specifics on the backgrounds and characteristics of the participants. 
Administrative Procedure 
While some populations, e.g. college students, are adept at technology and prefer 
a web-based delivery of requests for participation, other populations (educated and 
professionally trained) prefer mailed requests for participation (Shih & Fan, 2008). The 
experimental instrument was mailed through the United States Postal Service in priority 
mail envelopes, accompanied by an introduction letter from the dissertation committee 
chair, an Institutional Review Board approved cover letter hand signed by the researcher, 
a set of instructions, and a stamped pre-addressed return envelope. Audit committee 
members on the mailing list were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups, 
and the corresponding instrument mailed.  
The first responses were received within a week of the initial mailing and 
continued for approximately eight weeks. Ten recipients who were not audit committee 
members sent letters, called, or emailed to indicate their status. Undeliverable sets of 
materials were also received, and if more accurate addresses were available, the 
undeliverable sets of materials were re-mailed. For the first four weeks after the original 
mailing, 65 sets of materials were re-mailed using regular USPS first class mail. Another 
59 sets of materials were received but not re-mailed because better addresses could not be 
found or they were received after four weeks from the initial mailing.  
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After four weeks, one treatment group had relatively few responses; therefore, a 
limited remailing of identical case materials to 80 randomly selected audit committee 
members in this group was conducted. In total, 129 completed cases were received,
6
 
including a minimum of 20 usable cases in each treatment group. A different return 
mailing label was used for the limited second mailing to 80 audit committee members, 
and none of these were returned completed. It is possible, though, that the receipt of the 
second mailing by the selected participants served as a reminder to complete and mail the 
original case. The final response rate, adjusted for non-audit committee member 
notifications and returned materials, is 16%. This rate is within the range of past non-
sponsored mailed studies using audit committee members as participants (Wilbanks et al., 
2015). Table 3 shows the breakdown of mailings and responses by treatment group. The 
original number mailed is unadjusted for returns, and provides the number of mailings of 
each case type out of the 866 total mailings. 
Table 3 Mailings and Responses Received by Treatment Group 
Treatment Group 1 2 3 4 
#Mailed (unadjusted) 204 234 210 218 
Cases received 28 31 31 38 
Cases usable 21 30 25 33 
  
Design and Experimental Manipulation 
I used a 2x2 factorial design in this experimental study. I manipulated audit firm 
tenure (short/long) and mandatory audit firm rotation (required/not required) randomly 
between subjects in a fully crossed design. I designed a case-based instrument to present 
and administer the experiment, and randomly assigned participants to the treatment 
groups. I identified the treatment groups by the manipulation of the independent variables 
                                                 
6
 One completed case was returned by a respondent who had no public company audit committee 
experience; this case was excluded from the response count. 
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for audit firm tenure (short/long) and mandatory rotation (required/not required). Table 4 
summarizes the 2x2 experimental design and includes the minimum number of 
participants required in each cell, which was achieved. 
Based on Casterella & Johnston (2013) and Johnson, Khurana, & Reynolds 
(2002), I identified short tenure in the case as three years, and long tenure as 10 years (in 
excess of the noted studies’ seven and nine years, respectively).7 Brandon & Mueller 
(2008) test perceptions of tenure length in their study of juror assessments of blame 
related to auditor tenure, and their results support my characterization of short and long 
tenure. 
TABLE 4 2X2 Experimental Design and Minimum Number of Participants 
 
Audit Firm 
 Rotation Required 
Audit Firm  
Rotation Not Required 
Short Audit Firm Tenure 
(3 years) 
15-20 Participants 
 
15-20 Participants 
 
Long Audit Firm Tenure 
(10 years) 
15-20 Participants 
 
15-20 Participants 
 
 
I developed the experimental instrument as a brief case that presented a subjective 
accounting issue that had been brought to the audit committee after the audit firm and 
company management were unable to reach an agreement. The experimental instrument 
is provided in the appendix. The case provided background and current financial 
information for a fictitious company in the packaged foods industry. Industry benchmarks 
and actual public company financial data served as a pattern for the financial information 
                                                 
7
 The European Union’s recently adopted mandatory audit firm rotation policy requires rotation 
consideration at 10 years; Ghosh & Moon (2005) indicate average auditor tenure in their archival study at 
9.5 years. Both support the use of 10 years as representative of a realistic long tenure situation. 
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presented in the case. Some of the case data, wording, and questions were adapted from 
prior studies (Arel et al., 2006; DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b; Libby & Kinney, 2000). 
Through the case instrument, I presented a situation in which the audit firm had 
proposed an adjustment to increase the size of the Allowance for Doubtful Accounts and 
the accompanying Bad Debts Expense. The determination of an appropriate level of 
accounts receivable bad debts involves estimation and judgment using historic trends and 
current economic conditions, providing a sufficiently subjective accounting issue for the 
experimental case. The judgment and subjectivity pose a challenge for auditing of 
Accounts Receivables and related accounts, compounded by the exploitation of the 
subjectivity of accounting for allowances and bad debt write-offs by some firms to 
manage earnings (Riley & Pasewark, 2009).  
I provided information in the case regarding audit committee practices and 
characteristics, including the independence of the audit committee from management. I 
also described company management—CEO and CFO—in terms of reputation and 
tenure, providing a sound reputation to date and reasonable tenure to suggest prior 
credibility. I also provided the Earnings per Share (EPS) consensus estimate, and 
presented a case, following DeZoort et al. (2003b), wherein the impact of recording the 
proposed audit firm adjustment results in a missed EPS estimate, while the management 
position to waive the adjustment allows for achieving the EPS estimate.  
The primary dependent variable is the audit committee members’ indicated level 
of support for the audit firm or management in recording the audit firm proposed 
adjustment in the subjective issue auditor/management dispute. The level of support was 
measured in the experimental case instrument on a 0-10 scale, with 0 indicating 
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unwillingness to record the proposed adjustment (support of the management position), 
the 5 midpoint indicating a neutral position, and 10 indicating willingness to record the 
proposed adjustment (support of the audit firm position). The support dependent variable 
was used to test the posited influence of the manipulated variables (audit firm tenure and 
the rotation condition) on support for the audit firm in the dispute.  
Participants were then asked to answer a series of questions about audit firm 
integrity, expertise, independence, objectivity, and reliability using multi-item measures 
adapted from DeZoort et al. (2012). According to research using these reliability 
measures, audit firm independence and expertise impact audit firm objectivity, and audit 
firm integrity and objectivity are the formative constructs for audit firm reliability. The 
multi-item measures adapted from DeZoort et al. (2012) are shown in Table 5. The 
participants’ assessments of these audit firm characteristics were used to test hypotheses.  
Table 5 Measurement of Audit Firm Characteristics (DeZoort et al. 2012) 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
Integrity 
The audit firm’s professionals are truthful 
I do not believe what the professionals at the audit firm tell me
a 
I trust the audit firm’s professionals in this case 
The audit firm’s professionals are honest 
Expertise 
The audit firm has a great deal of experience 
The audit firm lacks the expertise needed in this engagement
a 
The audit firm has the technical knowledge needed to complete this engagement 
The audit firm has the ability to do the engagement
 
Independence 
The audit firm is independent in its relationship with the company
 
The audit firm is independent of the company management 
The audit firm is influenced by its financial relationship with the client
a 
The audit firm can be pressured by management to waive adjustments
a 
Objectivity 
The audit firm’s professionals are biased when providing services to the companya 
The audit firm’s professionals provide unbiased services to the company 
The audit firm’s professionals lack objectivity in their work related to the companya 
The audit firm’s professionals are objective when providing services to the company 
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Auditor Reliability 
I can rely on the audit firm’s work when deciding if the proposed adjustment should be 
recorded 
The audit firm’s work for the company should not be relied upona 
The audit firm’s proposed adjustment can be relied upon 
I cannot rely on adjustments proposed by the audit firm
a  
 
All items measured using an eleven-point scale anchored by 0 = “Strongly Disagree” and 10 = “Strongly 
Agree”, with a 5 = “Neutral” midpoint indicated. 
a 
Indicates an item that is reverse coded.  
 
I included a post-experiment manipulation check to determine if the participants 
noted the tenure and rotation conditions and remembered these conditions as they 
answered questions regarding the dependent variables (Libby, Bloomfield & Nelson, 
2002). Demographic data was also gathered from the participants. 
Several accounting academic researchers reviewed the experimental case prior to 
a pretest, and their feedback was incorporated into the case. The experimental materials 
were pretested using graduate students in a Masters of Accountancy program, and 
appropriate changes were made to the materials. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
reviewed and approved the study and the experimental materials, and IRB guidelines 
were followed in conducting the study.  
The results were analyzed using multivariate analysis of covariance 
(MANCOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to determine if significant 
differences in the mean level of audit committee member Support (and the other 
dependent variables) for the audit firm proposed adjustment can be identified between the 
treatment groups. Covariates for MANCOVA / ANCOVA analysis were identified from 
prior research, and included management experience, CPA certification, and years of 
audit committee experience (e.g., Bierstaker et al., 2012; DeZoort et al., 2003a; DeZoort 
& Salterio, 2001; Knapp, 1987). Both DeZoort & Salterio (2001) and Knapp (1987) 
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found audit committee members who were top managers were more supportive of the 
auditor. Bierstaker et al. (2012) and DeZoort et al. (2003a) found audit committee 
experience related to support for the audit firm, and DeZoort et al. (2003a) found CPAs 
to be more supportive of the auditor. The final MANCOVA model is shown below. 
(Expertise, Independence, Objectivity, Reliability, Support) = ƒ (rotation, tenure, 
rotation x tenure, natural log of #years AC experience, #years of management 
experience, CPA status)
8
 
 
After I analyzed the MANCOVA model, I used individual ANCOVA models to 
test hypotheses H1 through H5. The ANCOVA model for H5 (Support) is shown below. 
Similar ANCOVA models were used to test hypotheses H1 through H4. 
Support = ƒ(rotation, tenure, rotation x tenure, natural log of #years audit 
committee experience, #years management experience, CPA status)  
                                                 
8
 Years of AC experience is skewed (p < 0.001), so I use the natural log of this variable. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
Manipulation Check 
I asked the participants two manipulation check questions as part of the case 
questions. The manipulation check helped to determine if the participants noted and 
understood the audit firm tenure and rotation conditions and remembered them as they 
completed questions about the dependent variables. I examined the manipulation check 
responses from the public company audit committee members to determine if the 
manipulation checks were passed. Of the 129 responses, two failed the tenure 
manipulation check and six failed the rotation manipulation check. One respondent 
returned the responses without the case materials, and so no manipulation check was 
possible. The total pass rate for the manipulation check was 93%. This manipulation 
check pass rate is higher than that of previous studies using audit committee members as 
participants, including DeZoort et al. (2003a) (62%) and Bierstaker et al. (2012) (88%). 
A further review of the responses indicated five with missing data for the dependent 
variables, and six with no variation in their responses (straight-line) for the audit firm 
characteristics questions. After removing these participants, 109 observations remained 
for hypotheses testing.  
Participant Demographics
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Table 6 provides demographic results for the 109 audit committee members. The 
participants’ average age was 63, with a range of 44-75. Over 70% of the participants 
were 60 or older. Almost 90% of the participants (96) were male, consistent with prior 
research (DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b; Bierstaker et al., 2012). All of the participants 
had a Bachelor’s degree, 38% had a Master’s degree, 11% had a law degree (JD), and 6% 
had earned a PhD, DBA, or MD degree. Of the 109 participants, 41 (37.6%) held the 
CPA certification, and 72 (66.1%) qualified as audit committee financial experts. In 
terms of professional experience, 38 participants (34.9%) had external auditor 
experience, and 90 participants (82.6%) reported having top management experience. 
Slightly over half of the participants (53%) were retired.  
In terms of industry, Banking/Financial Services industry was indicated by 31 
participants, accounting for the highest percentage of respondents (28.4%), followed by 
Pharma/Medical/Healthcare indicated by 26 participants (23.9%) and Energy/Oil & Gas 
by 19 (17.4%). Accounting, Manufacturing, Real Estate, and Telecommunication/Media 
industries were each indicated by 7 participants (6.4%). The top four job titles indicated 
by participants were President/CEO (56 respondents, 51.4%), followed by Vice President 
(39, 35.8%), CFO (19, 17.4%), and Partner (15, 13.8%).  
Over half of the participants were currently serving just one audit committee (58 
respondents, 53.3%), 26 participants (23.9%) were serving two audit committees, 15 
(13.8%) were serving three audit committees, and eight (7.3%) were serving between 
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four and seven audit committees.
9
 A majority of participants (67.6%) had served in total 
three or fewer audit committees, 21 (19.5%) had served four or five total audit 
committees, and 14 (13%) had served 6-11 audit committees. Approximately one third of 
the participants (33.6%) reported the largest company on whose audit committee they 
served had under $250 million in annual revenue, and another approximately one third 
(34.6%) reported serving companies with total annual revenues of over $1 billion. 
Participants reporting between 2 and 5 years of audit committee experience totaled 41 
(37.6%), 54 (49.6%) reported 6 to 10 years of audit committee experience, and 14 
(12.8%) reported 20 to 45 years of audit committee experience. Audit firm rotation had 
been implemented by the corporate board for only 21 (19.3%) of the participants.  
Table 6 Participant Demographics (n =109 Audit Committee Members) 
 
Variable        Number  Percent 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Age  
44 - 48           2      1.9% 
50 - 59         29    26.8% 
60 - 69         51    47.2% 
70 - 75          26    24.1% 
Gender  
 Male          96               89.7% 
 Female        11    10.3% 
 
Education (Highest Level) 
 Bachelors        48    46.1% 
 Masters         41    37.6% 
 JD           12    11.1% 
 PhD/DBA/MD         8      6.0% 
 
Members with CPA certification       41    37.6% 
 
Members Qualifying as Financial Experts        72    66.1% 
 
                                                 
9
 Two participants out of the 109 usable responses are currently serving no audit committees, having 
recently resigned from their audit committee positions. All respondents have a minimum of two years of 
audit committee experience. 
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Members with External Audit Experience     38    34.9% 
Years of External Audit Experience  
  Under 10 years       15    39.5% 
 10 years - < 20 years            9    23.7%  
 20 years --   40 years       14    36.8% 
 
Members with Top Management Experience     90    82.6% 
Years of Top Management Experience 
              1   - 10 years       31    33.3% 
 > 10 years - 20 years       35    38.9% 
 > 20 years - 40 years       24    26.7% 
 
Industry Experience 
 Banking/Financial Services      31    28.4% 
 Pharma/Medical/Healthcare      26    23.9% 
 Energy/Oil & Gas       19    17.4% 
 Accounting          7      6.4% 
 Manufacturing         7      6.4% 
 Real Estate          7      6.4% 
 Telecommunications/Media        7      6.4% 
 Other Areas Reported by less than 5% of participants 
 
Job Title 
 President/CEO       56    51.4% 
 Vice President        39    35.8% 
 CFO         19    17.4% 
 Partner (BIG 4, Law, Investment)     15    13.8% 
 Chairman        14    12.8% 
 Investor/Investment Advisor        8      7.3% 
 Lawyer          7      6.4% 
 Other Job Titles Reported by less than 3% of participants 
 
Number of Audit Committees Currently Served  
 0 (Recently Resigned)        2      1.8% 
 1         58    53.3% 
 2          26    23.9% 
 3          15    13.8% 
 4-7            8      7.3%  
 
Total Number of Audit Committees Ever Served 
 1         35    32.4% 
 2         20    18.5% 
 3         18    16.7% 
 4                10      9.3% 
 5          11    10.2% 
 6-11          14    13.0% 
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Approximate Annual Revenues of Largest Audit Committee Served 
 Under  $250 million       36     33.6% 
 $250  -   500 million       18     16.8% 
 $501  -       1 billion       16     15.0% 
 Over          1 billion       37     34.6%  
 No Answer            2       1.8% 
  
Years of Audit Committee Experience 
  2            3      2.8% 
  3-5         38    34.8% 
  6-10         33    30.3% 
 11-16          21    19.3% 
 20-45                    14    12.8% 
 
Boards that have Implemented Audit Firm Rotation       21    19.3% 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Perceptions of the Case Instrument 
  
Participants were asked to assess the case instrument in terms of realism, 
understandability, and difficulty. The case instrument perceptions were all assessed on an 
11-point scale, with endpoints “Not at All Realistic”, “Not at All Understandable”, and 
“Not at All Difficult” at 0, and “Very Realistic”, Very Understandable”, and “Very 
Difficult” at 10. The realism mean of 5.4 out of 10 (SD = 2.56) is not significantly 
different from the scale midpoint of 5 (p = 0.104), although neither the review of the case 
materials by academic researchers nor the pretest revealed any issues with case realism. 
There is, in fact, a wide distribution for the case realism assessment, and comments are 
provided by participants at each end of the spectrum. At the low end, some participants 
commented that the issue in the case would not reach the audit committee and would be 
settled by management and the audit firm. At the other end, some participants felt the 
case was very realistic. The wide array of comments most likely reflects the difference in 
audit committee experiences between companies. Respondents found the case 
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understandable (mean = 8.0, SD = 1.64) and not difficult (mean = 3.3, SD = 2.44). Both 
the understandability and difficulty assessments are significantly different from the 
midpoint (p <= 0.001 for both), and the case difficulty assessment is significantly 
correlated (r = 0.279, p < 0.01) with the assessment of case realism.  
Dependent Variable Analysis 
The dependent variables in the case are the participants’ assessment of the audit 
firm’s characteristics of expertise, independence, objectivity, and reliability, and the 
measure of support the respondent provides for the audit firm proposed adjustment. The 
dependent variables will be discussed in the order of the related hypotheses. The audit 
firm characteristics are assessed based on 11-point scale responses to four statements 
each for the four characteristic constructs. An integrity characteristic construct is also 
measured, although no hypothesis was put forth for integrity since it is not expected to be 
influenced by the manipulations in the case. The scales are labeled with endpoints 
“Strongly Disagree” at 0 and “Strongly Agree” and 10. A “Neutral” label is provided at 
the midpoint. Participants were asked to place a slash (/) on the line to indicate their 
response.
10
 Consistent with DeZoort et al. (2012), certain of the 20 statements for the 
audit firm characteristics are reverse coded. 
The support variable is assessed by asking respondents who they favor in the 
accounting dispute, recorded on an 11-point scale anchored with “Favor Management 
(No Adjustment)” at the 0 point, “Neutral” at the midpoint, and “Favor Audit Firm 
(Record Adjustment)” at the 10 point. Respondents were also asked to indicate who the 
“typical” audit committee member would favor in the disagreement as a way to deal with 
                                                 
10
 Responses were recorded to the tenth between the horizontal markers; while participants were asked to 
make slash marks on the scales, approximately 26% of the participants marked the scales in another 
manner, with 13 marking an “x”, 12 circling a scale point, and 3 using a checkmark or arrow.  
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social desirability bias (SDB). Fisher (1993) examined the tendency of individuals to give 
responses to survey questions based on what they perceived a socially acceptable answer 
should be. Asking the same question in the indirect format is designed to illicit the true 
perceptions of the participant. The use of the indirect questioning technique resulted in an 
alternate dependent variable for support labeled typical support. 
Results of a pairwise t-test indicate that the means of support and typical support 
are not statistically different (p = 0.106), although quite close to marginally different. 
Further, when considered by experimental condition, there is marginal evidence of a 
difference between support and typical support in the required rotation condition (n = 46; 
p = 0.087).
11
 In this condition, the mean of support is 4.37, versus 4.80 for typical 
support, indicating that typical audit committee members would be more supportive of 
the auditor than the participant supplying the assessment would be.
12
 To better 
understand any bias implied by the participants, I consider both support and typical 
support in the subsequent analyses, as well as a BIAS measure, which reflects the 
difference between the support and typical support measures for each participant. 
Descriptive statistics for the five dependent variables, plus the alternate dependent typical 
support, are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Variable n Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Expertise 109 3.25 10 7.75 1.65 
Independence 109 3.50 10 7.95 1.22 
Objectivity 109 3.50 10 7.74 1.37 
Reliability 109 0.00 10 6.77 1.58 
Support 109 0.20 10 4.48 2.47 
                                                 
11
 All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise indicated. 
12
 One might expect SDB to cause participants to view themselves as more supportive of the auditor than 
less supportive due to the emphasis on audit committee independence from management promoted by 
SOX. In this case setting, most of the participants sided with management, making the SDB effect more 
difficult to interpret. 
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Typical Support 108 0.00 10 4.79 2.38 
11-point scales, 0-10 
 
The dependent variables for the audit firm characteristics are averages of the 
responses for the four measurement questions for each construct. The means of the audit 
firm characteristic constructs are all significantly different from the midpoint of 5 (p < = 
0.01), indicating that respondents in general assessed the audit firm as having expertise, 
independence, objectivity, and reliability above the neutral position. Reliability is the 
only characteristic for which the participants assessed the full range of 0 to 10, although 
only one participant assessed audit firm reliability at a score of 0.  
I used Cronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of the multiple item measures. 
Expertise has a measurement reliability of 0.89, objectivity of 0.75, and the audit firm 
characteristic reliability of 0.75, all of these above the suggested minimum of 0.70 (Hair, 
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Cronbach’s alpha for independence was 0.62, below 
the suggested level, implying that the four separate independence measures are not 
necessarily a stronger measure of independence when combined. The mean of support for 
the audit firm adjustment is also significantly different from the midpoint of 5 (p = 
0.029), while the mean of typical support is not significantly different from the neutral 
position (p = 0.366). Of the 109 participants, 57 (52.3%) assessed their level of support 
for the auditor proposed adjustment between 0—“Favor Management (No 
Adjustment),”—and the Neutral position at the scale midpoint of 5; 17 participants 
(15.6%) assessed their support at neutral; 35 participants (32.1%) assessed support at 
more than neutral to a high of 10—“Favor Audit Firm (Record Adjustment).”13 
                                                 
13
 Participants were asked about their level of concern for an audit firm resignation or audit fee increase if 
they did not support the audit firm position (0 “Not a Concern” and 10 “Significant Concern”) for both 
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The result of correlation analysis among the five continuous dependent variables 
supports the use of multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA). The results of the 
correlations for the dependent variables expertise, independence, objectivity, reliability, 
and support are shown in Table 8, and correlations when “typical” support is substituted 
for support are shown in Table 9. 
Table 8 Dependent Variables Correlation Matrix with Support (n =109) 
Item Expertise Independence Objectivity Reliability 
Expertise     
Independence .373**    
Objectivity .594** .514**   
Reliability .508** .190* .383**  
Support .273** .076 .189* .577** 
Pearson Correlation; ** Significant at 0.01 level; *Significant at 0.05 level  
 
Table 9 Dependent Variables Correlation Matrix with Typical Support (n =108) 
Item Expertise Independence Objectivity Reliability 
Expertise     
Independence .373**    
Objectivity .594** .514**   
Reliability .508** .190* .383**  
Typical Support .112 .110 .070 .416** 
Pearson correlation; ** Significant at 0.01 level; *Significant at 0.05 level  
 
The correlation matrix using the support dependent variable shows significant 
correlations (p < = 0.05) between nine pairs of the dependent variables, and one pair with 
a correlation lacking significance. When typical support is substituted for the support 
dependent variable, correlations between seven pairs of dependent variables retain 
significance (p < = 0.05), and three pairs show no significant correlation. Overall, the 
significant correlation results are consistent with using the five dependent variables 
together in a MANCOVA. 
MANCOVA Analysis 
                                                                                                                                                 
questions. The means for concern about audit firm resignation (3.98) and fee increase (1.43) were both 
significantly different from the midpoint (p < = 0.01), reflecting relatively low levels of concern. 
46 
 
 
  
The two manipulated independent variables were included in the MANCOVA 
model with the five dependent variables. Several demographic variables were tested as 
possible covariates, and the three variables suggested by prior research were retained in 
the model. Two continuous variables (i.e., number of years of audit committee experience 
and number of years of top management experience) and one categorical variable (CPA 
status) are retained as covariates in the model. Descriptive data for the continuous 
covariates are shown in Table 10. The mean for years of audit committee experience is 
9.9 years, considerably above the minimum of two years’ experience required for 
participation in the study. The mean for years of management experience is 13.3, with 19 
participants reporting no management experience. 
Table 10 Descriptive Data for Continuous Covariates 
Covariate Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Years of Audit 
Committee Experience 
 
2 
 
45 
 
9.931 
 
7.5306 
Years of Management 
Experience 
 
0 
 
40 
 
13.29 
 
10.255 
 
The continuous variables were tested for skewness, and the number of years of 
audit committee experience tested positive for skewness (p < 0.001). Therefore, the 
natural log of the number of years of audit committee experience variable was computed 
and used in all models. The MANCOVA model is shown below: 
(Expertise, Independence, Objectivity, Reliability, Support) = ƒ (rotation, tenure, 
rotation x tenure, natural log of #years AC experience, #years of management 
experience, CPA status) 
 
The MANCOVA model in Table 11 is significant (F =1.78, p = 0.008). CPA 
status is significant in the model (F = 3.552, p = 0.005), and auditor tenure is significant 
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(F = 2.50, p = 0.035). A second MANCOVA was run using typical support.
14
 This model, 
shown in Table 12, is also significant (p = 0.011), and auditor tenure (F = 2.67, p = 
0.027) and CPA status (F = 3.412, p = 0.007) show similar significance in this second 
MANCOVA model.
15
  
Table 11 MANCOVA Results (Expertise, Independence, Objectivity, Reliability, Support) 
Item F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure  2.500 0.035 
Audit Firm Rotation 1.637 0.157 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 0.742 0.594 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1.551 0.181 
Years of Management Experience 0.840 0.524 
CPA 3.552 0.005 
Corrected Model* 1.780 0.008 
Intercept 94.173 0.000 
*Wilk’s Lambda Reported  ** Two-tailed p-value 
 
 
Table 12 MANCOVA Results (Expertise, Independence, Objectivity, Reliability, Typical 
Support) 
Item F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure  2.666 0.027 
Audit Firm Rotation 1.032 0.403 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 0.775 0.570 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1.473 0.206 
Years of Management Experience 0.890 0.491 
CPA 3.412 0.007 
Corrected Model* 1.730 0.011 
Intercept 91.365 0.000 
*Wilk’s Lambda Reported  **Two-tailed p-value                                 
 
ANCOVA Analyses 
Individual ANCOVA models were then run for each of the dependent variables 
separately to test hypotheses 1 through 5. For the models below, I first present and 
                                                 
14
 A third MANCOVA model run to include BIAS (participant’s personal response less typical audit 
committee member response) is significant, and BIAS is significant in this additional model (F = 6.161, p < 
0.001).  The CPA covariate (F = 3.289, p = 0.009) and audit firm tenure (F = 2.844, p = (0.019) retain their 
significance. 
15
 Analysis using n = 120, which includes participants who failed the manipulation checks or provided 
straight-line responses, provides similar MANCOVA results.  
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discuss the dependent variable means by condition and then present the ANCOVA 
results. 
The first dependent variable tested with ANCOVA was the audit firm 
characteristic expertise. The expertise construct is designed to measure the audit firm 
professionals’ technical knowledge, ability, and experience to achieve task-specific 
superior performance. Mean data for expertise are provided in Table 13. 
Table 13 Means for Hypothesis 1 (Audit Firm Expertise)  
(0 low to 10 high) 
(n = 109) 
 Audit Firm 
Rotation 
Required Not Required Total 
Audit Firm 
Tenure 
    
Short Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
7.92 
1.37 
21 
7.18 
1.96 
30 
7.48 
1.77 
51 
Long Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
8.30 
1.49 
25 
7.74 
1.50 
33 
7.99 
1.51 
58 
 
Total 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
8.13 
1.43 
46 
7.48 
1.75 
63 
7.75 
1.65 
109 
 
The difference in the mean value of expertise between the short (7.48) and long 
(7.99) tenure groups is marginally significant based on a one-tailed
16
 independent sample 
t-test (p = 0.056), consistent with H1a, but the reader is cautioned that in the ANCOVA 
below it is insignificant. The difference in means between the required rotation (8.13) and 
no required rotation group (7.48) is significant (p = 0.041), based on a two-tailed 
independent sample t-test, but it is opposite of the predicted direction. I predicted that 
required rotation would decrease assessment of expertise, as the limited engagement 
period would decrease the audit firm’s incentive to build firm specific expertise. 
                                                 
16
 P-values for t-tests are one-tailed if in the direction predicted in a hypothesis, else two-tailed; for 
conservatism, all ANCOVA p-values are two-tailed. 
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However, when audit firm rotation is required, the expertise assessment is higher than 
when no rotation is required. The Levene Test shows no heteroscadasticity for 
expertise.
17
 
The results of the ANCOVA model for expertise are shown in Table 14. The 
ANCOVA model for expertise is significant (F = 2.512, p = 0.026). Audit firm tenure is 
not significant (F = 2.096, p = 0.151) in the ANCOVA model, despite the tentative 
support provided by the difference in the means. An explanation for the lack of a 
significant difference in the mean level of expertise between short and long tenure could 
lie in the high level of expertise assessment by all participants in general. The mean level 
of expertise is significantly higher than the midpoint of 5 (p < 0.01), which likely results 
from the audit firm in the case being identified as a Big 4 firm. A smaller firm most likely 
lacks the imputed benefits of being a Big 4 firm and requires more years of experience to 
achieve a high assessment of expertise, while a Big 4 firm has reputational attribution of 
expertise. 
Audit firm rotation is significant (F = 5.379, p = 0.022) in the expertise ANCOVA 
model. While H1b predicted that the rotation manipulation would influence the 
assessment of expertise, I predicted that the no rotation requirement group would assess 
expertise higher than the when rotation required group. The data show that the expertise 
assessment is higher when rotation is required. The increased expertise assessment under 
board imposed rotation is counter to the prior literature and the basis of the 
expertise/independence trade-off, which both link rotation to reduced assessments of 
expertise. When considering the ANOVA model, there is no support for H1a, which 
                                                 
17
All of the dependent variables were tested in the same manner, and no evidence of heteroscadasticity was 
found.  
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predicts that longer tenure will positively influence the assessment of expertise. The 
covariate CPA status is significant (F = 5.324, p = 0.023), and CPAs (mean = 8.15) rate 
audit firm expertise higher than non-CPAs (mean = 7.51).  
Table 14 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 1 (Dependent Variable Audit Firm Expertise) 
 Df Mean 
Squared 
F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure (H1a)  1 5.249 2.096 0.151 
Audit Firm Rotation (H1b) 1 13.468 5.379 0.022 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 1 1.346 0.537 0.465 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1 0.073 0.029 0.865 
Years of Management Experience 1 6.548 2.615 0.109 
CPA 1 13.330 5.324 0.023 
Corrected Model* 6 6.290 2.512 0.026 
Intercept 1 482.701 192.784 0.000 
Error 102 2.504   
Total 109    
Corrected total 108    
*R-Squared = 0.129 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.078) **Two-tailed p-value 
Levene Test not significant (p = 0.171) 
 
The next dependent variable tested with ANCOVA was the assessment of audit 
firm independence. The independence characteristic is designed to measure the 
perception of the audit firm’s independence from management, and the ability of the 
audit firms’ professionals to withstand undue management pressure to influence financial 
statement outcomes. Mean data for independence are shown in Table 15.  
Table 15 Means for Hypothesis 2 (Audit Firm Independence)  
(0 low to 10 high) 
(n = 109) 
 Audit Firm 
Rotation 
Required Not Required Total 
Audit Firm 
Tenure 
    
Short Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
8.31 
1.17 
21 
7.73 
1.42 
30 
7.97 
1.34 
51 
Long Mean 
Std. Dev. 
7.84 
1.32 
8.02 
.95 
7.94 
1.12 
51 
 
 
  
N 25 33 58 
 
Total 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
8.05 
1.26 
46 
7.88 
1.20 
63 
7.95 
1.22 
109 
 
The difference in the mean value of independence between the short tenure (7.97) 
and long tenure (7.94) groups is not significant (p = 0.463), based on a one-tailed t-test. 
The difference in the mean between the required rotation (8.05) and no required rotation 
group (7.88) is not significant (p = 0.469), based on a two-tailed independent sample t-
test. These findings are inconsistent with H2a and H2b. The ANCOVA model is shown 
in Table 16.  
Table 16 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 2 (Audit Firm Independence) 
 df Mean 
Squared 
F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure (H2a)  1 0.192 0.136 0.713 
Audit Firm Rotation (H2b) 1 1.413 1.001 0.320 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 1 4.562 3.231 0.075 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1 2.396 1.696 0.196 
Years of Management Experience 1 1.003 0.710 0.401 
CPA 1 9.014 6.383 0.013 
Corrected Model* 6 2.869 2.032 0.068 
Intercept 1 469.960 332.813 0.000 
Error 102 1.412   
Total 109    
Corrected total 108    
*R-Squared = 0.107 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.054) **Two-tailed p-value 
Leven Test not significant (p = 0.232) 
 
The ANCOVA model for independence is marginally significant (p = 0.068). The 
ANCOVA results also reveal a marginally significant interaction between tenure and 
rotation at (p = 0.075). This disordinal
18
 interaction shows that the short tenure group is 
influenced by the rotation condition more so than the long tenure group. Further, the short 
tenure group assesses audit firm independence as higher when rotation is required, than 
                                                 
18
 A test of contrasts indicates that rotation policy is marginally significant when tenure is short (p = 0.060). 
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when rotation is not required. Therefore, limited support applying to the short tenure 
group is found for H2b, which predicts that the required rotation group will assess 
independence higher than the no rotation group.  
The ANCOVA also shows significance (p = 0.013) for CPA status, and CPAs 
(mean = 8.29) assess independence as higher than non-CPAs (mean = 7.75). No support, 
though, is found for H2a that predicted a main effect of the tenure manipulation on the 
assessment of audit firm Independence. 
The third ANCOVA model is for the dependent variable objectivity. The audit 
firm characteristic objectivity measures the ability of the audit firm professionals to 
manage cognitive biases and subjectivity that affect professional judgment. The mean 
data for objectivity are shown in Table 17.  
Table 17 Means for Hypothesis 3 (Audit Firm Objectivity)  
(0 low to 10 high) 
(n = 109) 
 Audit Firm 
Rotation 
Required Not Required Total 
Audit Firm 
Tenure 
    
Short Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
7.82 
1.34 
21 
7.54 
1.42 
30 
7.66 
1.38 
51 
Long Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
7.96 
1.48 
25 
7.69 
1.28 
33 
7.80 
1.36 
58 
 
Total 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
7.90 
1.40 
46 
7.62 
1.34 
63 
7.74 
1.37 
109 
 
The difference in the mean value of objectivity between the short tenure (7.66) 
and long tenure (7.80) groups is not significant (p = 0.290) using a one-tailed t-test. The 
difference in the mean between the required rotation (7.90) and no required rotation 
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(7.62) groups is also not significant (p = 0.294).These findings are inconsistent with H3a 
and H3b. The ANCOVA for objectivity is shown in Table 18. 
Table 18 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 3 (Audit Firm Objectivity)  
 df Mean 
Squared 
F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure (H3a)  1 0.938 0.559 0.456 
Audit Firm Rotation (H3b) 1 2.883 1.718 0.193 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 1 0.177 0.105 0.746 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1 0.119 0.071 0.791 
Years of Management Experience 1 0.028 0.016 0.898 
CPA 1 27.443 16.358 0.000 
Corrected Model* 6 5.024 2.995 0.010 
Intercept 1 478.496 285.486 0.000 
Error 102 1.678   
Total 109    
Corrected total 108    
*R-Squared = 0.15 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.100) **Two-tailed p-value 
Leven Test not significant (p = 0.577) 
 
The ANCOVA model for objectivity is significant (p = 0.01), and shows no 
significance for the effect of the tenure or rotation manipulation on the assessment of 
objectivity. These results, then, provide no support for H3a and H3b, which predicted an 
influence of audit firm tenure and rotation and the audit committee members’ assessment 
of objectivity. CPA status is significant (p <= 0.001), showing that CPAs (mean = 8.36) 
rate audit firm objectivity higher than non-CPAs (mean = 7.36).  
The fourth ANCOVA model is for the assessment of audit firm reliability. The 
reliability construct is designed to measure the condition where stakeholders consistently 
find the audit firm’s work and opinion credible and dependable. The mean data for 
reliability are shown in Table 19.  
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Table 19 Means for Hypothesis 4 (Audit Firm Reliability)  
(0 low to 10 high) 
(n = 109) 
 Audit Firm 
Rotation 
Required Not Required Total 
Audit Firm 
Tenure 
    
Short Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
6.48 
1.08 
21 
6.03 
1.72 
30 
6.22 
1.50 
51 
Long Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
7.51 
1.38 
25 
7.07 
1.58 
33 
7.26 
1.50 
58 
 
Total 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
7.04 
1.34 
46 
6.58 
1.72 
63 
6.77 
1.58 
109 
 
 
The difference in the mean value of reliability between the short tenure (6.22) and 
long tenure (7.26) groups is significant in a one-tailed t-test (p < 0.01), consistent with 
H4a. The mean difference between the required rotation (7.04) and no required rotation 
(6.58) groups is not significant using a two-tailed t-test (p = 0.128), inconsistent with 
H4b. Therefore, the tenure groups perceive audit firm reliability differently, with the long 
tenure group assessing reliability higher. 
 In the earlier audit firm independence section, I explained a difference in the 
perception of audit firm independence between the short and long tenure groups based on 
the rotation manipulation. The point of considering mandatory audit firm rotation is 
ultimately a potential increase in audit quality and audit firm reliability. A longer audit 
firm tenure increases perception of audit firm reliability. Required rotation increases the 
perception of audit firm independence for the short audit firm tenure group, but not for 
the long tenure group. However, required rotation does not increase perceptions of audit 
firm reliability for either tenure group. Presumably, the short tenure audit firms will 
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achieve higher reliability assessments as their tenure increases, but not if required 
rotation limits their ability to achieve a longer tenure.  
The reliability ANCOVA model is shown in Table 20. 
Table 20 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 4 (Audit Firm Reliability) 
 df Mean 
Squared 
F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure (H4a)  1 26.921 11.832 0.001 
Audit Firm Rotation (H4b) 1 5.872 2.581 0.111 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 1 0.125 0.055 0.815 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1 0.347 0.153 0.697 
Years of Management Experience 1 1.233 0.542 0.463 
CPA 1 0.853 0.375 0.542 
Corrected Model* 6 6.216 2.732 0.017 
Intercept 1 414.529 182.194 0.000 
Error 102 2.275   
Total 109    
Corrected total 108    
*R-Squared = 0.0138 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.088) **Two-tailed p-value 
Levene test not significant (p = 0.623) 
 
The reliability ANOVA is significant (p = 0.017) and audit firm tenure is 
significant (p = 0.001). This means that audit firm tenure manipulation has a significant 
influence over audit committee member assessment of audit firm reliability, with the long 
tenure group perceiving greater reliability than the short tenure group. Audit firm rotation 
is not significant (p = 0.111). These findings add to the support for H4a, but do not 
support H4b, that predicted a relationship between required rotation and reliability. 
The last of the ANOVA models relate to the support and typical support 
dependent variables. These variables measure the level of support the audit committee 
member participants indicated for the audit firm’s proposed adjustment. Mean data are 
shown in Tables 21 and 22. 
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Table 21 Means for Hypothesis 5 (Support for Audit Firm Adjustment)  
(0 Supports Management to 10 Supports Audit Firm)  
(n = 109) 
 Audit Firm 
Rotation 
Required Not Required Total 
Audit Firm 
Tenure 
    
Short Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
4.45 
2.52 
21 
3.99 
2.30 
29 
4.18 
2.38 
50 
Long Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
5.10 
2.29 
25 
5.49 
2.26 
33 
5.32 
2.26 
58 
 
Total 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
4.80 
2.39 
46 
4.76 
2.38 
62 
4.79 
2.38 
108 
 
Table 22 Means for Hypothesis 5 (Typical Support for Audit Firm Adjustment) 
(0 Supports Management to 10 Supports Audit Firm) 
(n = 108) 
 Audit Firm 
Rotation 
Required Not Required Total 
Audit Firm 
Tenure 
    
Short Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
7.92 
1.37 
21 
7.18 
1.96 
30 
7.48 
1.77 
51 
Long Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
8.30 
1.49 
25 
7.74 
1.50 
33 
7.99 
1.51 
58 
 
Total 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
N 
8.13 
1.43 
46 
7.48 
1.75 
63 
7.75 
1.65 
109 
 
The difference in the mean of support between the short tenure (4.18) and long 
tenure (5.32) groups is significant using a one-tailed t-test (p = 0.022), as is the difference 
in the mean of typical support (p = 0.006) between the short (7.48) and long tenure (7.99) 
groups. This finding provides support for H5a, which posits that the level of support for 
the audit firm will be higher when audit firm tenure is long, as opposed to short. The 
difference in the mean support between the required rotation (4.80) and no required 
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rotation (4.76) groups is not significant (p = 0.702), based on a two-tailed t-test. For 
typical support, the difference in the mean between the required rotation (8.13) and no 
required rotation (7.48) groups is not significant (p = 0.971) using a two-tailed t-test. This 
finding provides no support for H5b, which predicted that audit committee member 
support for the audit firm would increase when rotation was not required. The ANCOVA 
models for support and typical support are shown in Tables 23 & 24. 
Table 23 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 5 (Support for the Audit Firm Adjustment) 
 df Mean 
Squared 
F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure (H5a)  1 23.132 3.858 0.052 
Audit Firm Rotation (H5b) 1 1.124 0.187 0.666 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 1 0.036 0.006 0.938 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1 15.947 2.660 0.106 
Years of Management Experience 1 0.002 0.000 0.986 
CPA 1 2.792 0.466 0.497 
Corrected Model* 6 7.452 1.243 0.291 
Intercept 1 90.566 15.104 0.000 
Error 102 5.996   
Total 109    
Corrected total 108    
*R-Squared = 0.068 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.013) **Two-tailed p-value 
Levene Test not significant (p = 0.314) 
 
Table 24 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 5 (Typical Support for the Audit Firm Adjustment) 
 df Mean 
Squared 
F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure (alt test of H5a)  1 25.828 4.871 0.030 
Audit Firm Rotation (alt test of H5b) 1 0.025 0.005 0.945 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 1 3.798 0.716 0.399 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1 22.183 4.184 0.043 
Years of Management Experience 1 4.769 0.899 0.345 
CPA 1 0.058 0.011 0.917 
Corrected Model* 6 11.458 2.161 0.053 
Intercept 1 88.813 16.751 0.000 
Error 102 5.302   
Total 109    
Corrected total 108    
*R-Squared = 0.114 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.061) **Two-tailed p-value 
Levene Test not significant (p = 0.719) 
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The ANCOVA model for support is not significant (p = 0.291), so no further 
interpretation of the results is appropriate (audit firm tenure is significant at p = 0.052 in 
this insignificant model). The ANCOVA model for typical support is significant (p = 
0.053). In the typical support model, audit firm tenure is significant (F = 4.871, p = 
0.030), providing support for H5a in this alternate test based on typical support. Audit 
firm rotation is not significant, so H5b, which predicted increased support for the audit 
firm when rotation was not required, is not supported. The covariate for natural log of 
audit committee experience is significant (p = 0.043). This significance indicates that 
audit committee members with more audit committee experience show increased support 
for the audit firm and the proposed adjustment, as confirmed by a positive correlation (r = 
0.217, p = 0.024).  
 Based on my earlier discussion of SDB, I calculated a new variable BIAS for the 
difference between support and typical support to measure the difference in the individual 
observations. I added this BIAS variable as a covariate to the support ANCOVA model to 
control for the impact of a socially desirable response effect. This ANCOVA model is 
shown in Table 25. The ANCOVA model for support with the BIAS variable as a 
covariate is significant (F = 5.121, p < 0.001). The BIAS covariate is also significant (p < 
0.001). Audit firm tenure and years of audit committee experience retain their 
significance in this alternate model, providing support for H5a. 
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Table 25 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 5 (Support for the Audit Firm Adjustment with BIAS)) 
 df Mean 
Squared 
F p-value** 
Audit Firm Tenure (H5a)  1 24.054 5.026 0.027 
Audit Firm Rotation (H5b) 1 0.154 0.032 0.858 
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation 1 1.385 0.290 0.592 
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience 1 19.215 4.015 0.048 
Years of Management Experience 1 1.582 0.331 0.567 
CPA 1 0.363 0.076 0.783 
BIAS 1 128.821 26.918 0.000 
Corrected Model* 6 24.506 5.121 0.000 
Intercept 1 90.206 18.849 0.000 
Error 100 4.786   
Total 108    
Corrected total 107    
*R-Squared = 0.264 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.212) **Two-tailed p-value 
 
To summarize the results of the testing,
19
 the audit firm tenure manipulation 
(short or long) has no significant effect on the participants’ assessment of audit firm 
expertise, independence, or objectivity. Although the ANCOVA model for support is not 
significant, the alternate model controlling for the social desirability bias is significant, 
and shows that longer audit firm tenure and more years of audit committee experience 
increase support for the audit firm. The audit firm tenure manipulation does result in 
participants in the long tenure group assessing audit firm reliability higher than the short 
tenure group (p = 0.001), and the long tenure group reporting that the “typical” audit 
committee member would provide more support for the audit firm’s proposed adjustment 
                                                 
19Sensitivity testing was conducted using the participants’ perceptions of the case instrument by adding 
realism, difficulty, and understandability as covariates (one at a time); with only understandability showing 
significance in the MANCOVA model (p < 0.001). Understandability was also significantly correlated with 
audit firm expertise (r = 0.280, p = .003), independence (r = 0.335, p < 0.001), objectivity (r = 0.493, p < 
0.001), and reliability (r = 0.266, p = 0.005). The ANCOVA models were then re-run with the 
understandability variable included as a covariate. The understandability covariate was significant in the 
four audit firm characteristics models, but not in the support or typical support models. With 
understandability included, the other results were qualitatively similar to the basic findings reported (CPA 
is marginally significant in two models, where it had p < 0.05 without understandability included). 
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(p = 0.03). Therefore, statistical support is found for H4a and in the alternate testing of 
H5a (the typical support ANCOVA and the support ANCOVA with BIAS included).   
The rotation manipulation (required or not required) results in a significant 
difference in the mean between groups (p = 0.022) on the assessment of audit firm 
expertise (H1b), although the required rotation group assessed expertise higher than the 
no rotation group, when the opposite was predicted. The rotation manipulation does not 
have a significant direct effect on assessments of audit firm objectivity or reliability. A 
marginally significant (p = 0.075) interaction effect of the tenure and rotation 
manipulation is found for independence, resulting in the short tenure group providing a 
higher assessment of independence when audit firm rotation is required. Overall, the 
hypotheses related to auditor rotation are not supported, although the interaction effect 
does provide very limited support for H2b. 
Two covariates are identified as having an impact on the dependent variables. 
CPA status has a significant effect on assessments of audit firm expertise (p = 0.023), 
independence (p = 0.013), and objectivity (p < 0.001), with CPAs more positive about the 
audit firm than non-CPAs.
20
 A favorable audit firm bias from audit committee members 
with CPA status provides incentive for companies to consider CPA status when 
nominating audit committee members. These CPA audit committee members potentially 
provide a balance to management pressure on the audit committee. The number of years 
of audit committee experience (natural log) has a significant positive effect (p = 0.043) 
on typical support, and on support with the BIAS covariate included (p = 0.048). Thus, 
                                                 
20
A similar ANCOVA model for the audit firm integrity characteristic is marginally significant (p = 0.06), 
and shows a significant positive effect (p < 0.001) for CPA status; CPAs (mean = 8.17) rate audit firm 
integrity higher than non-CPAs (mean = 7.57). 
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there is some evidence that more experienced audit committee members provide greater 
support to the audit committee, another factor that companies may consider. 
Descriptive Statistics for Participants’ Assessment of Management Characteristics 
While the case manipulations were designed to influence perceptions about the 
audit firm, the support question calls for audit committee member judgment involving the 
audit firm and management. Audit committee members most likely formed an opinion of 
both the audit firm and management while reading the case materials. Characteristics of 
management were not manipulated in the case; therefore, all participants were provided 
the same facts regarding management. Participants were asked to rate management’s 
credibility and experience, as well as the amount of pressure management was under to 
meet the analysts’ EPS expectation. Participants found management to be credible (mean 
= 6.69, SD = 1.70), experienced (mean = 6.89, SD = 1.59), and under considerable 
earnings pressure (mean = 7.14, SD = 1.85). All of the means are significantly different 
than the midpoint of 5 (p < = 0.01). Table 26 provides descriptive statistics for the 
management characteristic assessments, and this information is helpful in considering the 
judgment rationales provided in the next section.  
Table 26 Descriptive Statistics for Management Characteristics 
Characteristic n Min Max Mean Std.Dev. 
Credibility
a 
109 2.0 9.5 6.69 1.70 
Experience
b 
108 1.0 9.5 6.89 1.59 
Pressure
c 
109 .60 10 7.14 1.85 
aCredibility was assessed on an 11 point scale anchored by “Not at all Credible” and “Very Credible.” 
b
Experience was assessed on an 11 point scale anchored by “Not at all Experienced” and “Very 
Experienced.” 
cPressure felt by management to meet analysts’ EPS expectation was assessed on an 11 point scale 
anchored by “None” to “A Great Deal.” 
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Participants’ Rationale for Support Decision 
The auditor/management dispute in the case was designed to be subjective, 
requiring the use of judgment by the audit committee member participants in making 
their support decision. Audit committee member participants were asked to provide a 
rationale for their support decision with the question, “What factors account for your 
response?” The previous discussion of participants’ assessments of audit firm 
characteristics and management characteristics provides a foundation for a discussion of 
the rationales provided.  
A total of 52 participants listed an accounts receivable factor or metric (e.g., days 
sales’ outstanding, customer credit rating) as justification for their support decision. 
Providing some evidence that the case information was balanced, 23 participants cited an 
accounts receivable factor or metric in support of the audit firm, three participants cited 
the same in the neutral support position, and 26 participants cited an accounts receivable 
factor or metric in support of the management position. 
The subjective nature of the dispute, and the need for judgment, were also cited 
by audit committee members providing a range of support. The judgmental nature of the 
issue was cited by one participant providing support for the audit firm, five participants 
indicating a neutral support position, and eight participants who provided support for the 
management position. The auditor position appears to have received the least benefit 
from the subjective nature of the case. Continuing the discussion of the rationale for 
support for the management position, 31 participants (28.4%) indicated a bias toward 
management on the basis of business experience and/or having the best information, in 
comparison to the audit firm, about the business and its customers. Seven participants 
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cited a lack of persuasiveness of the audit firm’s case for recording the adjustment, and 
four participants felt that the audit firm was too restrictive, too conservative, or too risk 
averse. One participant cited the need to protect the company’s share price as rationale to 
support management. 
Twelve participants cited materiality as a basis for their support decision, eight of 
whom provided support for the management position, one provided neutral support, and 
three supported the audit firm. Participants supplemented the materiality justification 
with the sentiment that further adjustment to bad debt expense could occur in later 
periods if called for. Fifteen participants cited the need for more information, of which 10 
provided neutral support, three supported the audit firm, and two supported management. 
Fifteen participants noted a need to reach a compromise and acknowledged that good 
points were presented by both the management and audit firm, of which 12 assessed 
Support at neutral, two participants supported management, and one supported the audit 
firm.  
Thirty-five participants provided support for the audit firm position, indicating a 
Support level above neutral. While 23 specifically mentioned accounts receivable 
metrics, 11 participants attributed their support for the audit firm to the 
expertise/independence of the audit firm. Accounting conservatism was cited by eight 
participants who supported the audit firm, and six described a bias toward the audit firm’s 
position. Six participants cited skepticism of management and/or earnings management 
as a reason to support the audit firm, and one participant cited their duty to provide 
oversight for shareholders.  
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Table 27 summarizes the justification provided by participants for their Support 
position, grouped by their level of support for the audit firm proposed adjustment from a 
low of 0, “Favor Management (No Adjustment),” to Neutral at the scale midpoint of 5, to 
a high of 10, “Favor Audit Firm (Record Adjustment).”  
Table 27 Justification for Support 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Justification                    n   
Panel A: Support For Management (Between 0 and Less Than 5) n=57 
1. Bias toward management business knowledge/experience  31 
2. Accounts receivable metrics and factors    26 
3. Audit firm position is not persuasive     10 
4. The support decision is based on judgment       8 
5. Materiality/Adjust next period       8 
6. Audit firm too restrictive, too conservative, too risk adverse   4 
 
Panel B: Neutral Support (Support=5) n=17 
1. Management and audit firm both make good points   12 
2. More information needed to decide on support level   10 
3. The support decision issue is based on judgment     5 
  
Panel C: Support for the Audit Firm (Over 5 and up to 10) n=35 
1. Accounts receivable metrics and factors    23 
2. Audit firm expertise and/or independence (objectivity)  11 
3. Conservatism          7 
4. Tend to support the audit firm in disputes      6 
5. Skeptical of management        6 
 
Most of the 109 participants provided more than one reason for their support. 
One respondent made no response regarding the justification for their support decision. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS,  
LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study examines the effects of audit firm tenure (short or long) and audit firm 
rotation (required or not required) on public company audit committee members’ support 
for an audit firm proposed adjustment on a subjective accounting issue. I predicted that 
longer audit firm tenure and no required rotation would increase the level of support for 
the audit firm proposed adjustment. Perceptions of audit firm characteristics were 
examined to help to understand and interpret the results. The audit firm characteristics are 
adopted from an auditor reliability framework (DeZoort et al., 2012), and include 
expertise, independence, integrity, objectivity and reliability, although no hypothesis was 
offered for the relationship between audit firm tenure/rotation and integrity. 
The primary results indicate that longer audit firm tenure results in higher 
perceptions of audit firm reliability, and participants believe that the typical audit 
committee member would be more supportive of longer tenured auditors. When 
controlling for social desirability bias, the long tenure group provided more support for 
the audit firm proposed adjustment than the short tenure group. Participants with more 
years of audit committee experience were more supportive of the audit firm. The required 
rotation group assessed audit firm expertise higher than the no rotation group. A 
marginally significant interaction between audit firm tenure and rotation resulted in the 
short tenure group assessing audit firm independence higher when rotation was required 
than when rotation was not required. The hypotheses predicting differences in the 
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responses for objectivity, reliability, and support based on audit firm rotation 
(required/not required) are not supported. CPA status is associated with increased 
perceptions of auditor expertise, independence, and objectivity, suggesting that audit 
committee members that have CPA status have more favorable views of audit firms than 
non-CPAs.  
The use of a subjective accounting issue in the experimental case invited the use 
of judgment by participants in deciding on a level of support for the audit firm proposed 
adjustment. An examination of the justification provided by participants for their support 
decision provides insight into the audit committee process. In this study, audit firm tenure 
(short or long) does not influence public company audit committee members’ perceptions 
of auditor expertise, but participants in the longer tenure group provided more support for 
the audit firm proposed adjustment. Audit firm rotation (required/not required) influences 
perceptions of audit firm independence for participants in the short tenure group. Out of 
108 participants providing a rationale for their support decision, 11 (10%) cited audit firm 
expertise, independence, or objectivity as a reason for their support of the auditor. 
Conservatism, a tendency to support the external audit firm, and skepticism of 
management were cited by other participants who supported the audit firm.  
For the 52.3% of participants (57 participants) who supported the management 
position, neither audit firm independence nor expertise (or a lack thereof) was cited as a 
reason to support management. The justification provided by participants who supported 
management centered on a belief that management knows the business and the customers 
better than the audit firm, and the audit firm did not provide a compelling argument to 
override management’s position. Prior research has supported that subjective accounting 
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issue adjustments are waived more often than objective ones (Braun, 2001; Nelson, 
Elliot, & Tarpley, 2002; Wright & Wright, 1997), and that audit firms are at a 
disadvantage to management on subjective issues (Deis & Giroux, 1992). The results of 
the current study suggest that the audit firm in the case was at a disadvantage to public 
company audit committee members when a subjective issue resulted in a dispute. 
Comments provided by almost a third of the audit committee member participants of the 
current study suggest an audit committee member bias toward management that the audit 
firm must overcome with a strong and persuasive case.  
DeZoort et al. (2008) found that audit committee members seemed more 
supportive of the audit firm in accounting disputes with management post-SOX, 
compared with the pre-SOX period. Kaplan & Mauldin (2008) reported that audit 
committee members tend to support the audit firm in many experimental judgment 
studies, although that level of support does vary with the conditions presented and the 
type of manipulations. The comments provided by audit committee members in this case 
suggest a change in that trend, as a majority of participants supported management – 
although I acknowledge that the case materials differ across studies. Further research 
focused on audit committee member biases is required to help interpret the implication 
regarding a potential audit committee member pro-management bias.  
 This study has some limitations related to the experimental design. In an attempt 
to isolate the manipulated variables, the case seemed unrealistic to some participants. The 
delivery method using the USPS and finding addresses through publicly available 
information resulted in the return of case materials for lack of deliverability, which can 
reduce the sample’s representativeness of the population. Experimental findings are not 
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always generalizable to other populations, other accounting disputes, or different 
accounting regulation environments. 
The results have implications for public policy, practice, and future research. In 
terms of public policy, mandatory audit firm rotation for U.S. companies has been 
discussed as a means of increasing auditor independence, although the trade-off is 
suggested to be a decline in the perception of audit firm expertise. In this study of audit 
committee member judgment for mid-size U.S. firms, audit firm rotation increased the 
perception of independence for short tenure audit firms, but not for longer tenure audit 
firms. Required rotation did, though, increase the level of perceived expertise for all audit 
firms, a result counter to the predicted effect and prior literature. However, mandatory 
rotation does not impact audit quality measured by audit firm reliability, nor result in 
increased support for the audit firm over management in accounting disputes. As the 
auditor reliability framework suggests, audit firm reliability should be the goal of public 
policy. Longer audit firm tenure is supported in this study as a primary factor in audit 
committee perception of audit firm reliability.  
The findings of this study will also inform policy makers and corporate boards on 
public company audit committee member awareness of the pressure on management to 
manipulate earnings. The dispute in the experimental case centered on subjective 
accounting issues that require estimation and judgment, focused on accounts that can be 
used for earnings manipulation, and presented evidence of an earnings management 
incentive in the potential to miss an EPS estimate. While some study participants (13.8%) 
stated a need for more information in the case, and six (5.5%) expressed skepticism of 
management, the majority of participants (52%) supported management and made no 
69 
 
 
 
mention of a possible earnings management issue. Combined with a possible implied pro-
management bias, a lack of awareness of a condition suggestive of an earnings 
manipulation issue indicates a potential for decreased vigilance of some audit committee 
members against management earnings manipulation. 
Many participants offered comments to provide more information on public 
company audit committee processes. Additional qualitative research conducted through 
in-depth interviews of audit committee members about changing processes would add to 
the accounting literature, as changing regulatory and professional environments impact 
the audit committee process. PCAOB (AS 16, para 22) requires audit committee 
members to be apprised of contentious accounting issues, even if they are settled, 
between the audit firm and management. Comments provided by participants in this 
study suggest many audit committee members are involved in the external audit process 
and in communication with the audit firm as proposed adjustments are considered. The 
results of this study present questions regarding the continued impact of Sarbanes-Oxley 
and other governance improvement measures on audit committee member independence 
from—and perhaps biases toward—management, and on the objectivity of audit 
committee members in general.  
Implications of this study’s findings for public companies also extend to 
characteristics of potential audit committee members. The results suggest that recruiting 
CPAs as audit committee members will promote increased perceptions of audit firm 
expertise and independence, and especially audit firm objectivity. Results also suggest 
that recruiting audit committee members with more audit committee experience promotes 
a more conservative attitude toward financial reporting. A review of the rationales 
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provided by participants for their support decision implies that many audit committee 
members are engaged in oversight of the external audit process. The findings suggest that 
audit committee members relate increased audit firm tenure to audit firm reliability, and 
provide more support for audit firms with longer tenure.  
Further research is called for in several areas, including audit firm rotation. Audit 
firm rotation mandated at the regulatory level is unlikely in the U.S. audit environment. 
However, approximately 20% of the participants in this study reported that the companies 
they serve have adopted mandatory audit firm rotation as a governance mechanism. 
Future research into company mandated audit firm rotation would provide insights into 
the cost and benefits of such a policy. Additional research into audit committee member 
biases would also provide useful guidance to public companies in promoting effective 
financial reporting. Finally, continued research into audit committee processes, 
particularly external audit oversight and awareness of earnings management pressure, 
would benefit stakeholders of public companies.  
  
71 
 
REFERENCES 
Almer, E. D., Philbrick, D. R., & Rupley, K. H. (2014). What drives auditor selection? 
Current Issues in Auditing, 8(1), A26-A42. 
Arel, B., Brody, R., & Pany, K. (2006). Findings on the effect of audit firm rotation on 
the audit process under varying strengths of corporate governance. Advances in 
Accounting, 22, 1-27. 
Bamber, M. E., & Iyer, V. M. (2007). Auditors' identification with their clients and its 
effect on auditors' objectivity. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 26(2), 1-
24. 
Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., & Neal, T. L. (2009). The audit 
committee oversight process. Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(1), 65-122. 
 
Bédard, J., & Gendron, Y. (2010). Strengthening the financial reporting system: Can 
audit committees deliver? International Journal of Auditing, 14, 174-2010. 
Bierstaker, J. L., Cohen, J. R., DeZoort, F. T., & Hermanson, D. R. (2012). Audit 
committee compensation, fairness, and the resolution of accounting 
disagreements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 31(2), 131-150. 
Boone, J. P., Khurana, I. K., & Raman, K. (2008). Audit firm tenure and the equity risk 
premium. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 23(1), 115-140. 
Boone, J. P., Khurana, I. K., & Raman, K. (2012). Audit market concentration and 
auditor tolerance for earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
29(4), 1171-1203. 
Brandon, D. M., & Mueller, J. M. (2008). The influence of jurors' perceptions of auditor 
tenure on blame. Advances in Accounting, 24, 1-7. 
Braun, K. W. (2001). The Disposition of Audit-Detected Misstatements: An Examination 
of Risk and Reward Factors and Aggregation Effects. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 18(1), 71-99. 
Brown, H. L., & Wright, A. M. (2008). Negotiation research in accounting. Accounting 
Horizons, 22(1), 91-109. 
  
72 
 
Brown-Liburd, H. L., & Wright, A. M. (2011). The effect of past client relationship and 
strength of the audit committee on auditor negotiations. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory, 30(4), 51-69. 
Cameran, M., Francis, J. R., Marra, A., & Pettinicchio, A. (2015). Are there adverse 
consequences to mandatory auditor rotation? Evidence from the Italian 
experience. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 34(1), 1-24. 
Carcello, J. V., & Nagy, A. L. (2004). Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial 
reporting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(2), 55-69. 
Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., & Ye, Z. (2011, August). Corporate Governance 
Research in Accounting and Auditing: Insights, Practice Implications, and Future 
Research Directions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 30(3), 1-31. 
Carcello, J. V., Neal, T. L., Palmrose, Z.-V., & Scholz, S. (2011). CEO involvement in 
selecting board members, audit committee effectiveness, and restatements. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(2), 396-430. 
Carver, B. T. (2014). The retention of directors on the audit committee following an 
accounting restatement. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 51-68. 
Casterella, J. R., & Johnston, D. (2013). Can the academic literature contribute to the 
debate over audit firm rotation? Research in Accounting Regulation, 25, 108-116. 
Chen, C.-Y., Lin, C.-J., & Lin, Y.-C. (2008). Audit partner tenure, audit firm tenure, and 
discretionary accruals: Does long auditor tenure impair earnings quality? 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(2), 415-445. 
Chi, W. (2005). The effect of mandatory audit-firm rotation: A monitoring perspective. 
Research in Accounting Regulation, 18, 283-285. 
Chi, W., Lisic, L. L., & Pevner, M. (2011). Is enhanced audit quality associated with 
greater real earnings management? Accounting Horizons, 25(2), 315-335. 
Chu, L., Church, B., & Zhang, P. (2012). Does long tenure erode auditor independence? 
CAAA Annual Conference.  
Cohen, J. C., Gaynor, L. M., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. M. (2011). The impact of 
auditor judgments of CEO influence on audit committee independence. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice & Theory, 30(4), 129-147. 
Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. (2010). Corporate governance in the post 
Sarbanes-Oxley era: Auditors' experiences. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
27(3), 751-786. 
  
73 
 
Daniels, B. W., & Booker, Q. (2011). The effects of audit firm rotation on perceived 
auditor independence and audit quality. Research in Accounting Regulation, 23, 
78-82. 
Davis, L. R., Soo, B. S., & Trompeter, G. M. (2009). Auditor tenure and the ability to 
meet or beat earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(2), 517-
548. 
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 3, 183-199. 
Deis, D. R., & Giroux, G. A. (1992). Determinants of Audit Quality in the Public Sector. 
The Accounting Review, 67(3), 462-479. 
DeZoort, F. T., Hermanson, D. R., & Houston, R. W. (2003a). Audit committee support 
for auditors: The effects of materiality justification and accounting precision. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22, 175-199. 
DeZoort, F. T., Hermanson, D. R., & Houston, R. W. (2003b). Audit member support for 
proposed audit adjustments: A source credibility perspective. Auditing: A Journal 
of Practice & Theory, 22(2), 189-205. 
DeZoort, F. T., Hermanson, D. R., & Houston, R. W. (2008). Audit committee member 
support for proposed audit adjustments: Pre-Sox versus post-SOX judgments. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 27(1), 85-104. 
DeZoort, F. T., Holt, T., & Taylor, M. H. (2012). A test of the auditor reliability 
framework using lenders' judgments. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
37(8), 519-533. 
DeZoort, T. F., & Salterio, S. E. (2001). The effects of corporate governance experience 
and financial-reporting and audit knowledge on audit committee member 
judgments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 20(2), 31-47. 
Dopuch, N., King, R. R., & Schwartz, R. (2001, June). An experimental investigation of 
retention and rotation requirements. Journal of Accounting Research, 39(1), 93-
117. 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26, 301-325. 
Firth, M., Rui, O. M., & Wu, X. (2012). How do various forms of auditor rotation affect 
audit quality? Evidence from China. The International Journal of Accounting, 47, 
109-138. 
  
74 
 
Fisher, R. J. (1993). Social Desirability and the Validity of Indirect Questioning. Journal 
of Consumer Research, 20(2), 303-315. 
Fontaine, R., Khemakhem, H., & Herda, D. N. (2015). Audit committee perspectives on 
mandatory audit firm rotation: Evidence from Canada. Journal of Management & 
Governance, 1-18. 
Gates, S. K., Lowe, J. D., & Reckers, P. M. (2007). Restoring public confidence in 
capital markets through auditor rotation. Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(1), 5-
17. 
Gavious, I. (2007). Alternative perspectives to deal with auditors' agency problems. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 18, 451-467. 
Gaynor, L. M., McDaniel, L. S., & Neal, T. L. (2006). The effects of joint provision and 
disclosure of nonaudit services on audit committee members' decisions and 
investors' preferences. The Accounting Review, 81(4), 873-896. 
Geiger, M. A., & Raghunandan, K. (2002). Auditor tenure and audit reporting failures. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 21(1), 67-78. 
Gendron, Y., & Bédard, J. (2006). On the constitution of audit committee effectiveness. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31, 211-239. 
Ghosh, A., & Moon, D. (2005). Auditor tenure and perceptions of audit quality. The 
Accounting Review, 80(2), 585-612. 
Gibbins, M., McCracken, S., & Salterio, S. (2005). Negotiations over accounting issues: 
The congruency of audit partner and chief financial officer recalls. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, 24(Supplement), 171-193. 
Gibbins, M., Salterio, S., & Webb, A. (2001). Evidence about auditor-client management 
negotiation concerning client's financial reporting. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 39(3), 535. 
Gramling, A. A., Jenkins, J. G., & Taylor, M. H. (2010). Policy and research implications 
of evolving independence rules for public company auditors. Accounting 
Horizons, 24(4), 547-566. 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B., & Anderson, R. E. (2010). Multivariate Data 
Analsysis (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hatfield, R. C., Jackson, S. B., & Vandervelde, S. D. (2011). The effects of prior auditor 
involvement and client pressure on proposed audit adjustments. Behavioral 
Research in Accounting, 23(2), 117-130. 
  
75 
 
Hollingsworth, C., & Li, C. (2012). Investors' perceptions of auditors' economic 
dependence on the client: Post-sox evidence. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & 
Finance, 27(1), 100-122. 
Hoyle, J. (1978). Mandatory audit rotation: The arguments and an alternative. Journal of 
Accountancy, 69-78. 
Iacobucci, D. (2010). Structural equations modeling: Fit indices, sample size, and 
advanced topics. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20, 90-98. 
Iyer, V. M., & Rama, D. V. (2004). Clients' expectations on audit judgments: A note. 
Behavioral Research in Accounting, 16, 63-74. 
Jenkins, D. S., & Velury, U. (2008). Does auditor tenure influence the reporting of 
conservative earnings? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 27, 115-132. 
Jenkins, D. S., & Vermeer, T. E. (2013). Audit firm rotation and audit quality: evidence 
from academic research. Accounting Research Journal, 26(1), 75-84. 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976, Oct.). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-
360. 
Joe, J., Wright, A., & Wright, S. (2011). The impact of client and misstatement 
characteristics on the disposition of proposed audit adjustments. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice and Theory, 30(2), 103-124. 
Johnson, V., Khurana, I., & Reynolds, J. (2002). Audit-firm tenure and the quality of 
financial reporting. Contemporary Accounting Research, 19(4), 637-660. 
Jones, K. L., Aier, J., Brandon, d. M., Carpenter, T. D., Gaynor, L. M., Knechel, W. R., . 
. . Walker, P. L. (2012). Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the 
Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 37: PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, Concept 
Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation. Current Issues in 
Auditing, 6(1), C15-C27. 
Kaplan, S. E., & Mauldin, E. G. (2008). Auditor rotation and the appearance of 
independence: Evidence from non-professional investors. Journal of Accounting 
& Public Policy, 27, 177-192. 
Keune, M. B., & Johnstone, K. M. (2012). Materiality judgments and the resolution of 
detected misstatements: The role of managers, auditors, and audit committees. 
The Accounting Review, 87(5), 1641-1677. 
  
76 
 
Kim, J.-B., & Yi, C. H. (2009). Does auditor designation by the regulatory authority 
improve audit quality? Evidence from Korea. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 207-230. 
Knapp, M. C. (1987). An empirical study of audit committee support for auditors 
involved in technical disputes with client management. The Accounting Review, 
62(3), 578-588. 
Knapp, M. C. (1991). Factors that audit committee members use as surrogates for audit 
quality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 10, 35-52. 
Knechel, W. R., Krishnan, G. V., Pevzner, M., Shefchik, L. B., & Velury, U. K. (2013). 
Audit quality: Insights from the academic literature. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory, 32, 385-421. 
Kwon, S. Y., Lim, Y., & Simnett, R. (2014). The effect of mandatory audit firm rotation 
on audit quality and audit fees: Empirical evidence from the Korean audit market. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 33(4), 167-195. 
Li, D. (2010). Does auditor tenure affect accounting conservatism? Further evidence. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 29, 226-241. 
Libby, R., & Kinney, W. R. (2000). Does mandated audit communication reduce 
opportunistic corrections to manage earnings to forecasts? The Accounting 
Review, 75(4), 383-404. 
Libby, R., Bloomfield, R., & Nelson, M. W. (2002). Experimental research in financial 
accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27, 775-810. 
Lim, C.-Y., & Tan, H.-T. (2010). Does auditor tenure improve audit quality? Moderating 
effects of industry specialization and fee dependence. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 27(3), 923-957. 
Lin, J. W., & Hwang, M. I. (2010). Audit quality, corporate governance, and earnings 
management: A meta-analysis. International Journal of Auditing, 14, 57-77. 
Lisic, L. L., Neal, T. L., & Zhang, Y. (2011). The continuing impact of CEO power on 
audit committee effectiveness in the Post-Sox Era. Unpublished Manuscript. 
Magilke, M. J., Mayhew, B. W., & Pike, J. E. (2009). Are independent audit committee 
members objective? Experimental evidence. The Accounting Review, 84(6), 1959-
1981. 
Mande, V., & Son, M. (2011). Do audit delays affect client retention? Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 26(1), 32-50. 
  
77 
 
Myers, J. N., Myers, L. A., & Omer, T. C. (2003). Exploring the term of the auditor-
client relationship and the quality of earnings: A case for mandatory auditor 
rotation? The Accounting Review, 78(3), 779-799. 
Nelson, M., Elliot, J., & Tarpley, R. (2002). Evidence from auditors about managers' and 
auditors' earnings management decisions. The Accounting Review, 
77(Supplement), 175-202. 
Ng, T. B.-P., & Tan, H.-T. (2003). Effects of authoritative guidance availability and audit 
committee effectiveness in auditors' judgments in an auditor-client negotiation 
context. The Accounting Review, 78(3), 801-818. 
Pomeroy, B. (2010). Audit committee member investigation of significant accounting 
decisions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 29(1), 173-205. 
Riley, M. E., & Pasewark, W. R. (2009, September 1). Assessing the Allowance for 
Doubtful Accounts. Journal of Accountancy, 208(3), 40. 
Roush, P. B., Church, B. K., Jenkins, G., McCracken, S. A., & Stanley, J. D. (2011). 
Auditor rotation: The PCAOB considers a new direction. Current Issues in 
Auditing, 5(2), 15-20. 
Salleh, Z., & Stewart, J. (2012). The role of the audit committee in resolving auditor-
client disagreements: A Malaysian study. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 25(8), 1340-1372. 
Sharma, V. D., Sharma, D. S., & Ananthanarayanan, U. (2011). Client importance and 
earnings management: The moderating role of audit committees. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, 30(3), 125-156. 
Shih, T.-H., & Fan, X. (2008, August). Comparing Response Rates from Web and Mail 
Surveys: A Meta-Analysis. Field Methods, 20(3), 249-271. 
Srinivasan, S. (2005). Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: 
Evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 43(2), 291. 
Stefaniak, C. M., Robertson, J. C., & Houston, R. W. (2009). The causes and 
consequences of auditor switching: A review of the literature. Journal of 
Accounting Literature, 28, 47-121. 
Taylor, M. H., DeZoort, F. T., Munn, E., & Thomas, M. W. (2003). A proposed 
framework emphasizing auditor reliability over auditor independence. Accounting 
Horizons, 17(3), 257-266. 
  
78 
 
Wang, K. J., & Tuttle, B. M. (2009). The impact of auditor rotation on auditor-client 
negotiation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34, 222-243. 
Wright, A., & Wright, S. (1997). An examination of factors affecting the decision to 
waive audit adjustments. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 12, 15-
36. 
 
  
  
79 
 
 
Appendix 
 
  
  
80 
 
 
 
 
 
Dana R. Hermanson 
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise 
dhermans@kennesaw.edu 
 
 
February 6, 2016 
 
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>: 
 
As you know, the role of audit committee members is quite complex and often 
challenging. My doctoral student, Janice Rummell, is working on her dissertation, in 
which she is seeking to better understand audit committee members’ judgments. Dr. Todd 
DeZoort (The University of Alabama) and I are overseeing Janice’s research, and we are 
both experienced accounting researchers. Janice is an experienced CPA, CMA, and 
accounting professor. 
 
You are among a select group of audit committee members we are contacting to ask for 
assistance with Janice’s dissertation research. Your participation is very important to the 
success of the project and to gain a better understanding of the issues and challenges that 
audit committee members confront in practice. We certainly hope you will contribute a 
few minutes of your time to help us in this area. 
 
Completion of the enclosed case should take approximately 15-20 minutes. If you have 
any questions or would like to receive a summary of the results, please contact either 
Janice at jrummell@students.kennesaw.edu or me at dhermans@kennesaw.edu. Thank 
you very much for your support of this research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Dana R. Hermanson, Ph.D. 
 
Enclosures: Letter from Janice Rummell, Case, Return Envelope 
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RESEARCH STUDY: 
Audit Committee Members’ Role in Accounting Dispute Resolution 
 
 
Researcher’s Contact Information:  
Janice E. Rummell, (814) 255-3335, jrummell@students.kennesaw.edu 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study that I am conducting as part of the requirements to 
earn the Doctorate in Business Administration (DBA) in Accounting at Kennesaw State University. Before 
you decide to participate in this study, you should read this form and ask questions about anything you do 
not understand. All participants must be at least 18 years old. You can contact me using the contact 
information above. 
The study consists of a short case and a series of questions about the case, as well as questions about your 
audit committee experiences. The purpose of the study is to better understand audit committee members’ 
role in accounting dispute resolution. Your position as a public company audit committee member, your 
experience, and your expertise make your opinions and contribution very important to this study. The 
estimated time for completion is 15-20 minutes.  
Statement of Understanding for Participants 
The purpose of this research has been explained and my participation is voluntary. I have the right to stop 
participation at any time without penalty. I understand that the research has no known risks, and I will not 
be identified. By completing this case, I am agreeing to participate in this research project. 
THIS PAGE MAY BE REMOVED AND KEPT BY EACH PARTICIPANT. 
 
Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight 
of the Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to 
the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw, GA 
30144-5591, (470) 578-2268. 
Thank you for your time and assistance. Your participation in the research project is much appreciated, and 
will contribute to our understanding of audit committee member judgment.  
 
Janice E. Rummell 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1. The pages that follow contain a case and a series of questions. Some questions relate to the 
case, and some questions are about your audit committee experiences and demographic 
information. 
2. Please read the case materials, and answer the questions without looking ahead through the 
pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a way that 
reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable response, please 
 complete all of the questions. You will have an opportunity at the end of the materials to 
provide any comments or clarifications you would like to make. 
3. When you have completed the questions, insert the case and questions into the pre-addressed 
and stamped white envelope, seal it, and drop it into a USPS mailbox. Do not put your name 
on the case or questions. 
4. You are anonymous during this study. No effort will be made to link you to your responses 
on the following pages.  
 
RESEARCHER 
 
Janice E. Rummell, CPA, CMA 
Doctoral Student – Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University 
jrummell@students.kennesaw.edu 
(814) 255-3335 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE 
 
 
 
  
Dana Hermanson, Ph. D. (Chair) 
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair 
& Professor of Accounting 
Coles College of Business 
Kennesaw State University 
dhermanson@kennesaw.edu 
(470) 578 - 6077 
F. Todd DeZoort, Ph.D. 
Durr-Fillauer Chair in Business Ethics 
& Professor of Accounting 
Culverhouse School of Accountancy 
The University of Alabama 
tdezoort@cba.ua.edu 
(205) 348 - 6694 
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Please read the information below and answer the questions that follow as if you are serving as an 
audit committee member for AgPro, Inc.  
 
Company and Industry Background 
AgPro, Inc. is a publicly traded packaged foods company supplying grocery and commercial food 
markets in the United States and around the world. The industry is very competitive and AgPro 
competes on the basis of quality, value, customer service, and brand recognition and brand 
loyalty. Consolidation in the supermarket, warehouse club, and wholesale industries has resulted 
in increased ability of customers to negotiate favorable terms with AgPro, including increased 
discounts and extended payment periods. One big-box retailer accounts for almost 18% of 
AgPro’s total sales. Total sales revenue has decreased slightly in the past two fiscal years due to a 
combination of lower unit sales and price reductions designed to remain competitive. 
Financial Profile 
For the current fiscal year, relevant pre-audit balances are as follows: 
Sales     $650 million 
Total Assets    $550 million 
Accounts Receivable   $83 million 
Net Income    $14 million 
Earnings per Share (EPS)  $1.40 
Analysts’ Consensus EPS Forecast  $1.39 
 
Bad Debt Expense   $1.4 million 
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts $2.45 million 
Write-offs of Bad Debt               $1.1 million 
 
Management Team and Financial Reporting 
 
The CEO of AgPro has been in the position for 6 years, and the CFO has been in the position for 
5 years. Both are known and respected in the industry. Management faces pressure to meet 
performance targets, including analysts’ estimates for Earnings per Share (EPS), at a level that is 
common for companies in the industry. 
 
 
Audit Committee 
 
AgPro’s audit committee, on which you serve, has four members, one of whom is designated as a 
financial expert. The audit committee meets a minimum of four times per year, but meets more 
often as required to carry out its duties. The audit committee members are independent of the 
company’s management. The audit committee reviews all audit firm proposed adjustments. As a 
member of the audit committee, part of your responsibilities includes helping resolve any 
accounting disagreements between AgPro’s management and the external audit firm.  
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External Audit Firm Tenure and Continuance  
 
The following information pertains to the external audit firm engaged at AgPro: 
 
 AgPro has engaged a Big 4 audit firm that offers a wide array of accounting and auditing 
services through its network of offices. The audit firm provides AgPro with audit services 
and board approved tax preparation services.  
 This is the 3rd year (or 10th year) the audit firm has been engaged by AgPro.  
 The audit firm has previously issued standard, unqualified (clean) audit reports for the 
company. 
 A Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Policy has been implemented by AgPro’s Board of 
Directors after a review of corporate policy. Thus, the audit firm’s tenure with AgPro is 
now limited. This policy means that the audit committee must replace the current audit 
firm in two years. 
OR 
 No Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Policy has been implemented by AgPro’s Board 
of Directors, so the audit firm’s tenure with AgPro is not limited in any way. The 
audit committee and the audit firm can choose to continue or discontinue the engagement 
at any time. 
 
Accounting Issue before the Audit Committee 
 
The current year’s audit is in its final stages, and one disagreement over an audit firm proposed 
adjustment has been brought to the audit committee’s attention. The issue below will be discussed 
at the next audit committee meeting, held prior to releasing annual financial information.  
 
The disagreement relates to Accounts Receivable, Bad Debt Expense, and the related Allowance 
for Doubtful Accounts. Management recorded a Bad Debt Expense of $1,400,000. The audit 
firm feels strongly that this amount is too low and has proposed an adjustment to increase this 
amount by $350,000 to $1,750,000. The adjustment of $350,000 is 2.5% of Net Income. 
Recording the audit firm’s proposed adjustment would reduce EPS from $1.40 to $1.37, below 
the analysts’ consensus EPS forecast of $1.39. 
 
The audit firm’s basis for proposing an adjustment to increase the Bad Debt Expense includes: 
 
 The net Accounts Receivable balance is going up as a percentage of total assets, despite a 
slight decrease in Sales Revenue. 
 An aging schedule based on prior bad debt experience suggests that management’s 
estimate of Bad Debt Expense is below the audit firm’s estimate of a reasonable range. 
 The Days Outstanding in Accounts Receivable has increased by 4 days, from 31 days to 
35 days. The audit firm considers this to be a material change.  
 Average credit ratings of major customers are on the decline. 
 
Management strongly disagrees with the audit firm’s proposed adjustment and argues that: 
 
 The Bad Debt Expense reflects a similar percentage of Sales Revenue as in prior years.  
 At least one major customer has leveraged its negotiating position and has slowed 
payments by several days, but with no increase in collectability risk. 
 This year’s beginning balance of Allowance for Doubtful Accounts had grown in relation 
to bad debt write-offs over the past few years. 
  
85 
 
 For the past several years, the ratio of Bad Debt Expense to write-offs of bad debt has 
been greater than 1, suggesting an overestimation of Bad Debt Expense.   
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Please answer the following questions based on the information in the case above. You may refer 
back to the case information when responding. Place a slash anywhere on the line to indicate your 
response. 
 
1.  Based on the information provided, who do you favor in this accounting disagreement? (Place 
a slash  ( / ) anywhere on the line below) 
 
  
2.  What factors account for your response to question #1 above? 
 a. ___________________________________________________________________ 
 b. ___________________________________________________________________ 
 c. ___________________________________________________________________ 
3.  Based on the information provided, who do you think a typical audit committee member 
would favor in this disagreement? (Place a slash on the line below) 
 
 
 
4.  In audit firm/management dispute cases like the one in question #1 above, how much of a 
concern is the possibility of the audit firm resigning if you don’t support the audit firm’s 
position? 
 
 
 
5.  In audit firm/management dispute cases like the one in question #1 above, how much of a 
concern is the possibility of an audit fee increase if you don’t support the audit firm’s 
position? 
 
Favor Audit Firm 
(Record 
Adjustment) 
Favor 
Management  
(No Adjustment) 
    
Neutral 
Significant 
Concern 
Not a Concern Somewhat of  
a Concern 
Significant 
Concern 
Not a Concern Somewhat of  
a Concern 
Favor Audit Firm 
(Record Adjustment) 
Favor 
Management  
(No Adjustment) 
Neutral 
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6.  Based on the information provided, how credible did you perceive management to be? 
 
   
 
7.  Based on the information provided, how experienced in financial reporting do you perceive 
management to be?   
 
 
 
8.  Based on the information provided, how much pressure do you believe is on management to 
meet analysts’ EPS expectations?   
 
 
 
Please answer the following questions concerning characteristics of the audit firm. You may refer 
back to the case information when responding. Place a slash anywhere on the line to indicate your 
response.  
 
 
1. The audit firm has the technical knowledge needed to 
complete this engagement. 
 
2. The audit firm is independent in its relationship 
with the company. 
  
3. The audit firm is honest. 
 
4. The audit firm lacks objectivity in its work 
related to the company. 
 
Very Credible Not at all 
Credible 
 
 
Very Experienced Not at all 
Experienced 
A Great Deal None 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree 
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5. The audit firm is influenced by its financial 
relationship with the client. 
  
6. The audit firm has a great deal of experience. 
 
7. The audit firm is biased when providing services 
to the company. 
 
 
8. I do not believe what the audit firm tells me.  
 
9. The audit firm’s proposed adjustment can be 
relied upon. 
 
10. The audit firm is objective when providing 
services to the company. 
 
11. The audit firm’s work for the company should 
not be relied upon. 
  
12. The audit firm is independent of the company 
management. 
 
13. The audit firm lacks the expertise needed in this 
engagement. 
 
14. The audit firm has the ability to do the engagement. 
   
 
15. The audit firm is truthful. 
 
16. I can rely on the audit firm when deciding if 
the proposed adjustment should be recorded. 
 
17. The audit firm provides unbiased services  
to the company. 
 
18. The audit firm can be pressured by management 
to waive adjustments. 
 
19. I trust the audit firm in this case. 
 
20. I cannot rely on the adjustment proposed by the audit firm. 
  
Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree 
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Please answer these questions without referring back to the case materials. 
1. In this case, the audit firm has been conducting the AgPro audit for how many years? (circle 
one): 
a) 3 years 
b) 10 years 
2.  In this case, the audit firm’s tenure (circle one): 
a) is limited by a mandatory audit firm rotation requirement 
b) is not limited by a mandatory audit firm rotation requirement 
 
3.  How realistic did you find the case? (Place a slash anywhere on the line below) 
                     
 
 
4.  How understandable did you find the case? 
                 
 
 
 
5.  How difficult did you find the case? 
                      
 
 
6.  In your role as an audit committee member, how much of a concern is the resignation of the 
current audit firm, which would require you to find a replacement audit firm? 
                     
 
 
7.  In your role as an audit committee member, how much of a concern is the replacement of the 
audit firm if the current audit firm is dismissed by the audit committee? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Very Realistic Not at All 
Realistic 
Very Understandable Not at All 
Understandable 
Very Difficult Not at All 
Difficult 
Significant Concern Not a Concern Somewhat of a 
Concern 
Significant Concern Not a Concern Somewhat of a 
Concern 
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8.  In your role as an audit committee member, how often do you consider replacing the audit 
firm over accounting disagreements? 
            
  
Please respond to the following demographic questions. These will be used only to analyze the 
results, not to identify any participant. 
 
1.  Your age ___________ 
2.  Your gender ___________ 
3.  Highest educational degree (check one): 
 Bachelor’s _____ Masters              _____   JD     _____   PhD/DBA  _____ 
4.  Number of public company audit committees you currently serve  _____ 
5.  Have any of the companies on whose audit committee you serve implemented a mandatory 
audit firm  rotation policy? 
        Yes _______  No ________ 
6.  Approximate annual revenues of the largest public company on whose audit committee you 
currently serve (check one): 
     < $250 million   _____         501 million - $1 billion  _____  
$250-$500 million  _____                             > $ 1 billion  _____ 
7.  Total number of public company audit committees you have ever served  _____ 
8.  Total number of years of public company audit committee experience  _____ 
9.  Have you served, or are you currently serving, as an audit committee financial expert? 
        Yes  _____ No  _____ 
10.  Are you a CPA? Yes  _____ No  _____ 
 Other professional certifications? Please list: 
_______________________________________ 
11.  Have you ever worked as an external auditor?  Yes  _____ No  ______     
            If Yes, how many years?  __________ 
12.  Have you ever worked as CEO, CFO, or in another top management position?  Yes_____  
No _____ 
            If Yes, how many years? ____________ 
13.  Current job title, if employed   ________________________________________________ 
        IF RETIRED, indicate the last full time job title 
_________________________________________ 
Very Often Never Occasionally 
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14.  Primary industry in which you have employment or public company audit committee 
experience: 
        
__________________________________________________________________________
_____ 
 
If you have any additional comments, please provide them here: 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation. If you would like a copy of the study’s results, please 
enclose a business card or email one of the researchers. 
 
 
